








Ancestry, Diversity & Finance 



























Ancestry, Diversity & Finance: Evidence from Transition Economies*   
 
                           Akos Dombi 1                                                         Theocharis Grigoriadis 2 
                                 BUTE                                                                          FU Berlin  
 
Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the growth effects of historical and biological ancestry, diversity and 
financial development in transition economies. We show that the common indicators of ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization, state history and genetic distance yield significant results and to some extent transform the 
impact of finance on growth in East-Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. Deep ethnolinguistic 
cleavages produce insignificant results, whereas at intermediate and lower levels of aggregation diversity is 
likely to significantly improve the effect of finance on growth. Similarly to finer ethnolinguistic cleavages, 
genetic distance from the United States also favorably increases the relevance of financial development for 
growth. However, state history as a proxy for long-run ancestral exposure to institutions, political organization 
and centralization reinforces the negative growth effect of financial development. We argue that financial 
development is inclined to resolve problems arising from coordination failures and absence of trust in diverse 
societies by easing liquidity constraints and offering incentives for entrepreneurship to minority groups. In 
contrast, long state history is likely to generate extractive institutions that facilitate the provision of soft budget 
constraints. Genetic distance from the United States induces higher reliance on continental rather than Anglo-
Saxon financing practices, and therefore increases dependence on banks rather than bonds or equity for 
external liquidity purposes.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper analyzes the long-run effects of diversity and ancestry on the growth-finance relationship 
in post-socialist countries. We focus on the conditional effect of the banking sector given that capital 
markets are underdeveloped and relatively unimportant in transition economies. We identify 
structural breaks in the growth impact of banking sector development along three major legacy 
variables: ethnolinguistic fractionalization (at different aggregation levels), state history and genetic 
distance from the world technology frontier, the USA. These measures have gained considerable 
leverage in research on contemporary economic development. However, their possible effects on the 
growth-finance nexus have not been investigated yet. To our knowledge, we are the first to do this. 
The motivation behind this area of focus for our study is the historical flux which has naturally 
characterized the financial systems of transition countries since the collapse of socialism. The 
financial sector of transition economies has been transformed from a one-tier state-controlled banking 
system into an overwhelmingly bank-based and intermediately developed market financial system in 
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the last two and a half decades. This unparalleled dynamic provides fertile soil to explore the effects 
of diversity and ancestry on the growth-finance relationship.  
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009, 2012, 2013) offer a path-breaking theory of ancestry to explain 
long-run patterns of economic growth on a global scale. Similarly, Alesina et al. (2003) and Desmet 
et al. (2009) identify the crucial role of ethnolinguistic diversity for GDP per capita growth and 
redistribution. In this paper, we offer a comprehensive theory of ancestry and diversity in order to 
analyze the finance-growth nexus in transition economies. We argue that deeper ethnolinguistic 
cleavages do not matter for the growth impact of finance, whereas finer ones are conducive to the 
positive effect of financial development on long-run economic performance. Financial institutions 
are considered to be in a position to resolve problems of coordination and distrust in diverse societies 
and allow the development of the private sector, also for minorities that lack access to political office 
and lobbying. Moreover, the genetic distance to the world technology frontier, the US economy, 
positively enhances the impact of banking sector development on growth. Our results suggest that the 
diffusion of development hypothesis of Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) holds for the financial sector 
as well. Larger genetic distance to the Anglo-Saxon countries operates as an obstacle to the diffusion 
of all those norms, values and jurisdictions which promote the evolution of market-based financial 
systems. This implies a relatively larger reliance on, and thus a more positive effect of, the banking 
sector in transition countries with genealogically less relatedness to the USA.  
In contrast to diversity and genetic distance, state history seems to adversely affect the leverage of 
financial development on growth. We argue that state history as a proxy for ancestral exposure to 
centralization, political organization and institutions facilitates the provision of soft budget 
constraints as a result of moral hazard and rent-seeking institutions. Ang (2013) argues that state 
history has a positive effect on financial development around the globe and this could have significant 
implications for the growth paths of contemporary states. What he proposes is that state history is 
associated with more efficient financial transactions, bureaucracies and taxation (ibid.). In contrast, 
we concentrate on transition economies and propose that, in this case, state history strengthens the 
negative growth effect of financial development. This pivotal distinction between Ang’s paper (2013) 
and our paper lies in the following reasons. First, the institutional legacies of central planning, such 
as soft budget constraints and bureaucratic rent-seeking under conditions of imperfect monitoring, 
also perpetuate in the post-transition period. Second, Ang (2013) is much less conclusive about the 
finance-growth nexus, as his main results underscore the significant and positive effect of state history 
on financial development per se.  
It is important to stress here that our contribution to the current body of literature is two-fold. On 
the one hand, we expand the literature on the deep roots of economic development by offering a 
finance-growth perspective. On the other hand, we enrich the finance-growth literature along two 
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dimensions.3 First we provide a study that elaborates on the transition economies and their 
institutions. Second, we offer a new channel of nonlinear finance. The nonlinear effect of financial 
development on economic growth is an innovative, new strand of the general growth-finance 
literature initiated by Rosseau and Wachtel (2002) and Deiddaa and Fattouh (2002). Three potential 
channels of nonlinearity have been already identified. Rioja and Valev (2004b) and Huang and Lin 
(2009) argue that the effect of finance on growth depends on the stage of economic development. A 
second line of the literature emphasizes the nonlinearity according to the size of the financial sector 
(e.g. Rioja and Valev, 2004a; Law and Singh, 2014; Samargandi et al., 2015; Arcand et al. 2015). 
Finally, the conditioning effect of institutions (policies) on the growth-finance nexus is emphasized 
in Rousseau and Wachtel (2002), Demetriades and Law (2006) and Law et al. (2013). Beyond these 
(development/finance/institutional) perspectives, our paper establishes a fourth perspective in 
nonlinear finance by using diversity and ancestry threshold variables: the legacy perspective.4 
The key transition debates on the optimal sequencing of economic reforms and the welfare 
differences between shock therapy and gradualism have missed the important role of financial 
development and its linkages to ancestral institutions and diversity. In our paper, we argue that the 
relative successes and failures in economic transformation, stabilization and subsequent catching-up 
of East-Central Europe and the former Soviet Union also depend on the ways that state history, 
genetic distance and ethnolinguistic fractionalization have shaped the finance-growth channel.  
The paper is structured as follows. Sections 2 and 3 provide an overview of the literature on finance 
and growth in transition economies, as well as on ancestry, diversity and long-run economic 
performance. Section 4 presents the data and empirical strategy of the paper. In section 5, we present 
the results and perform relevant robustness checks. Section 6 offers an informed discussion of our 
results in the light of institutions, finance and long-run growth in transition economies. Section 7 
concludes.  
 
2. Finance & Growth in Transition Economies 
Koivu (2002) was among the first to research the growth-finance nexus in transition. Her results show 
that the bank lending-deposit interest rate spread (henceforth interest rate spread, or IRS) negatively 
affects growth, while the amount of private credit does not exert any significant effect. Koivu and 
Sutela (2005) corroborate these findings based on the same sample. Dawson (2003) reveals that liquid 
                                                          
3 For an overview of the general growth-finance literature see, e.g., Levine et al. (2000) and Levine (2005). 
4 The legacy perspective has already had some presence in the finance literature. La Porta et al. (1998) and Beck et al. (2003) 
provide invaluable insights into the decisive role of legal origin for financial development. Harper and McNulty (2008) 
demonstrate that legal origin is also relevant to the financial development of transition economies. Grosjean (2011) presents 
evidence on the historical legacy of the Ottoman empire on financial development in Southeastern Europe. Nevertheless, all 
these works constrain themselves to explaining the level of financial development and do not consider the growth-finance 
nexus.   
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liabilities were not a relevant growth determinant during the nineties in 13 transition countries. Botric 
and Slijepcevic (2008) also point out the negative effect of the interest rate spread on growth in South-
East European economies. Moreover, they are unable to uncover any significant explanatory power 
of non-performing loans in relation to economic growth. Djalilov and Piesse (2011), focusing on 27 
transition countries, conclude that credit to the private sector is not relevant for growth, while the 
interest rate spread affects growth negatively. They consider the average of the EBRD financial 
transition indicators as an overall composite measure for financial development as well. Their results 
show quite surprisingly that this overall measure is negatively correlated with growth. In contrast to 
the latter, Caporale et al. (2015) find that, in line with the predictions of theory, the average level of 
the financial transition indicators exerts large positive effect on growth. They also present some 
evidence on the positive effect of the financial sector size on growth. The recent study of Cojocaru et 
al. (2016) considers a larger set of proxies on the efficiency of the financial sector. Beyond the interest 
rate spread, they also include the concentration rate and the overhead costs of the banking sector in 
their analysis. According to their results, efficiency is superior to size when it comes to the growth 
effect of financial development, at least in transition economies.  
 These papers underscore the importance of financial development for economic growth in post-
socialism: efficiency measures of the financial sector (e.g. interest rate spread, overhead costs) are 
important for growth, while size measures (e.g. private credit, liquid liabilities) are less so.5 The 
literature provides three, one general and two transition-related, explanations about this robust 
finding. According to the general reasoning, the increase in the size of the financial sector can have 
different growth effects in the short- and the long-run. For example, Loayza and Rancière (2006) 
point out that the abrupt rise in private credit might result in financial turmoil thereby plaguing the 
short-term growth-finance relationship. Indeed, the results of Gaffeo and Garalova (2014) bolster the 
legitimacy of this timeframe argument in the case of transition economies as well. These authors 
estimate the short- and long-run growth effects of financial development with an error-correction 
model. According to their results, the size of the financial sector exerts a positive influence on growth 
in the long-run, while the short-run effect is less favorable and much more ambiguous. 
 Regarding the transition-specific reasons, Koivu and Sutela (2005) emphasize two possible 
explanations for the striking absence of any robust growth promoting effect of the size of the financial 
sector. First, targeted loans by state-owned banks, state subsidies and soft-budget constraints 
continued to prevail in some transition economies even several years after the collapse of the Soviet 
bloc. Under such circumstances, the increase in the amount of credit devoted to the private sector 
                                                          
5 Contrary to the experience of post-socialist transition countries, Zhang et al. (2012) unravel a robust positive growth 
effect in relation to several size-based financial development measures in China. However, considering its very special 
way of economic transition, the results on China are not really authoritative for other transition economies.  
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does not automatically entail the proliferation of efficient private investments. Second, banking crises 
were natural concomitants of economic transition during the nineties, which introduced temporary 
negative shocks into the growth-finance relationship (IMF 2014). The leverage of these arguments 
has certainly petered out for the 2000s and so recent studies based on more recent samples are less 
exposed to them. 
 The main body of the literature on transition economies almost completely ignores the most recent 
research issues of the general growth-finance literature. Indeed, there are only very few studies which 
consider the possible nonlinear effect of finance in transition countries. The most authoritative papers 
are Masten et al. (2008), Fink et al. (2009), Coricelli and Masten (2004) and Gillman and Harris 
(2004).      
Masten et al. (2008) investigate both the effect of financial development and financial integration on 
growth. In their paper, size-based measures of financial development are relevant for growth in neither 
transition nor non-transition economies. In contrast, integration into global financial markets is 
beneficial for growth, at least in transition economies. Moreover, these authors manage to reveal 
nonlinearity in the relationship between growth and financial integration along the level of financial 
development. They conclude that financial development, as a proxy for the absorptive capacity of an 
economy, is conducive for the unfolding of the positive growth effect of financial integration.   
 Fink et al. (2009) pose the question of whether the major segments of the financial sector, i.e. the 
bond, stock and banking market, have different effects on growth at different stages of economic 
development. They split their sample arbitrarily into high, middle and low-income countries, where the 
latter group is composed primarily of post-socialist countries. By running the estimations on the three 
sub-samples separately, the authors come to the conclusion that indeed the effect of the individual 
financial segments on growth depends on the stage of economic development. Furthermore, they find 
that the development of the financial sector is most beneficial in transition economies. 
 Coricelli and Masten (2004) introduce the interaction of private credit growth with the average of 
EBRD financial transition indicators into their growth regression. According to their results, the 
growth of private credit exerts a negative direct effect and a positive indirect effect on economic 
growth. Consequently, the overall growth impact of a credit expansion depends on the institutional 
quality of the financial sector. Gillman and Harris (2004) also apply interaction to control for 
nonlinearity in the growth-finance nexus. However, their focus is set on inflation as a conditioning 
factor. Quite surprisingly, their results show that in transition countries the effect of financial 
development on economic growth improves with a higher inflation rate. This runs counter to the 
findings of the general finance literature (Rousseau and Wachtel 2002).  
To sum up, the transition literature has revealed considerable positive growth effects in relation to 
the typical efficiency measures of the financial sector, such as the interest rate spread and overhead 
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costs. However, it has failed to prove the importance of the other key dimension of financial 
development, the size of the financial sector, in the growth process. The most frequent and relevant 
size measure, the amount of (domestic/private) credit, proved to be overwhelmingly irrelevant in 
growth regressions. Beyond the previously discussed considerations (i.e. the timeframe argument, the 
soft-budget constraint, the banking crises), another explanation for the missing growth - financial 
sector size link can be the ignorance of possible nonlinearities in the growth-finance relationship 
when it comes to transition economies. The results of the very few papers which consider nonlinearity 
in transition countries are suggestive from that point of view. Both in Gillman and Harris (2004) and 
Coricelli and Masten (2004) the main effect of the considered financial sector size measure is negative 
on growth, while its indirect effect embodied by the interaction term is positive. Moreover, in Koivu 
(2002), private credit becomes a relevant growth determinant in CIS countries after splitting the 
sample arbitrarily.6 
 
3. Ancestry, Diversity & Long-Run Economic Performance   
The role of long-term factors in economic development has shifted the focus of the literature from 
contemporaneous levels of institutional development toward deeply rooted cultural, historical and 
biological factors. Bockstette et al. (2002) construct the state history indicator of early development, 
which provides a composite measure of population exposure to centralized statehood and organized 
institutional and societal framework on the territory of a given country. They suggest that state history 
as a proxy for state capacity, ethnic homogeneity and dense population has a positive effect on 
economic growth.7  In their study on transition economies, Iliev and Putterman (2007) observe that 
within the Eurasian socialist group of states, societies with longer state history, higher geographic 
proximity to Western Europe or East Asia, and lower levels of ethnic diversity tend to perform better 
than others. This is the case both under socialism and in transition. In contrast to previous studies, 
Putterman and Weil (2010) adjust state history according to the ancestral affiliation of the present 
population based on their 1500 AD. origins. They argue that countries with populations originating 
from states with a longer history of agricultural and political development tend to be wealthier than 
others. Moreover, they find that population heterogeneity also induces higher economic growth, but, 
at the same time, stronger rates of income inequality as well. Ancestry as a factor of economic growth 
is linked with growth-spillover effects between groups with different state histories; the authors 
recognize the limits of providing a fully convincing story of why this is the case (ibid.). While state 
history is generally considered to be conducive to growth, Borcan et al. (2014) show that excessive 
state experience can be detrimental to economic performance due to the emergence of deeply 
                                                          
6 For a concise overview of the studies discussed in this section, see table A5 in the appendix. 
7 On the relationship between state history and economic growth, see also Chanda and Putterman (2005, 2007).  
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entrenched extractive institutions. This indicates a concave rather than a linear relationship between 
economic development and state history (ibid.).  
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013) provide a detailed overview on the effects of cultural, historical and 
geographic factors on economic growth and development. On the one hand, they share the arguments 
of Olsson and Hibbs (2005) and Ashraf and Galor (2013) on the positive role of favorable Neolithic 
conditions for productivity. On the other hand, they argue that genealogical relatedness between 
populations (also in Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009) can offer a solid basis for the transmission of 
technological progress and economic growth spillovers. At the same time, they do not make a case 
for genetic and cultural determinism in economic outcomes. It is clear that development policies can 
reduce the significance of historical barriers, but in order to do so the existence of the latter must first 
be identified (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2013). East-Central Europe, Southeastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union constitute an extremely diverse cultural and genealogical space whose 
characteristics can also account for divergent financial development and growth paths. Furthermore, 
in their more recent work, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2015) argue that countries with more closely 
related population groups in terms of religious, linguistic and genetic distances are more likely to 
engage in war across their borders. This is a very interesting thesis since it means, contrary to the 
Huntingtonian concept of the clash of civilizations, countries that are culturally dissimilar have been 
less inclined to be involved in militarized conflict over territory.8  
Ethnic and cultural diversity as drivers of contemporary socio-economic outcomes have been 
introduced by Alesina et al. (2003) and Fearon (2003). Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) observe that social 
conflict, coordination failures and lack of trust are generally negative consequences of fragmented 
societies. However, diversity can facilitate economic development through the skill complementarity 
channel. The difference between micro- and macro-levels of socio-economic organization is also 
significant in this respect. There is a growing body of literature pointing out that ethnic and cultural 
diversity are likely to be positive for growth at subnational levels (see discussion below).  
Desmet et al. (2012) also explore the key relationship between ethnolinguistic diversity and 
political economy outcomes such as the onset of civil war, redistributive policies and public goods 
provision. Their path-breaking contribution lies in the differential effect of diversity at different levels 
of linguistic aggregation (from 1 to 15). Deeper cleavages, where the aggregation levels for 
polarization and fractionalization are the highest, have a higher propensity toward civil war and 
redistribution (ibid.). However, finer linguistic differences start to matter when it comes to economic 
growth and public goods provision. In this case, diversity has a negative effect on growth and on 
                                                          
8 For the relationship between genetic distance and propensity to conflict in the form of fractionalization or polarization, 
see Arbatli et al. (2015). 
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coordination of the delivery of basic government services. In addition, linguistic fractionalization 
seems to matter consistently more than polarization (ibid.).  
Continuing the discussion in the direction of imperial and long-run institutional legacies, 
BenYishay and Grosjean (2014) propose that the divide between Russian and Ottoman imperial 
legacies, on the one hand, and German and Habsburg legacies, on the other, can powerfully explain 
divergent transition outcomes in the post-socialist region. In former Russian and Ottoman provinces, 
energy entrepreneurs were much more successful in opposing or capturing liberalization compared 
to former German and Habsburg provinces. This propensity to successfully resist liberalization is, 
according to BenYishay and Grosjean (2014), what explains different levels of concentration in the 
natural resource sector at the beginning of transition and, therefore, divergent long-run economic 
outcomes. Harper and McNulty (2008) observe a negative effect of Russian legal origin on levels of 
financial development in transition economies. La Porta et al. (2008) empirically corroborate the 
findings of their first theoretical paper (Djankov et al., 2003) on the significance of legal origins for 
economic performance. Nevertheless, their theory does not explicitly consolidate the superiority of 
common law over civil law, as it could have been argued earlier, but it also contends that civil law 
may dominate common law in terms of economic growth when the problem of disorder in a society 
is not so severe (as opposed to dictatorship). Still, they regard the market-supporting regulation of 
common law as more appropriate for economic growth under conditions of globalization than the 
policy-implementing nature of civil law, which reveals a clear preference for disorder rather than 
dictatorship. With respect to post-communist democratization, historical legacies seem to have 
captured divergent regime outcomes in Eastern Europe, Russia and Eurasia (Pop-Eleches, 2007).  
 
4. Data & Empirical Strategy 
We estimate typical Barro-regressions extended with a financial development measure and the 
interaction of the latter with a quantile dummy which controls for the potential regime effect of the 
underlying ancestry/diversity threshold variable. Our objectives are twofold. First, we intend to find 
evidence of the presence of a structural break in the growth-finance nexus along some deep-rooted 
ancestry and diversity determinants of economic development (henceforth deep-rooted development 
(DRD) variables). Second, we intend to reveal the differential nature of the effect of financial 
development on growth in the imputed lower and upper regimes of the distribution of the considered 
deep-rooted development variables. Hence, we build on the following baseline model specification:  
 




where the idiosyncratic disturbances are supposed to be non-correlated within and across units but 
their variance is allowed to be country-specific: 2(0, )it iNε σ , ( , ) 0  it ilCov t lε ε = ∀ ≠  and 
( , ) 0  it jlCov i jε ε = ∀ ≠ . In equation (1), i indexes the countries, t indexes the time, ln(y) is the log 
GPD per worker, αi is the fixed country effect, FD denotes financial development, DRD is the deep-
rooted development variable and DRD(#) is a dummy which indicates the position of a country in the 
distribution of transition countries along the given deep-rooted development variable. The value of 
DRD(#) is set to 1 if the country falls into the upper (100 – #) percent of the distribution, and it is set 
to zero otherwise. For example, in the case of # = 30, DRD(30) is 1 if the country disposes of a 
quantile value related to the deep-rooted development variable which is larger than 30 percent. If this 
is not the case, that is, if the value of the deep-rooted development variable falls into the lower 30 
percent of the underlying distribution, then DRD(30)=0. Note that by virtue of its construction 
DRD(#) is just a quantile dummy.    
We consider three financial development measures in our estimations, the FI index of Svirydzenka 
(2016), the amount of credit granted by deposit money banks to the private sector (private credit, or 
PCB) and the difference between the average lending and deposit interest rates in the banking sector 
(interest rate spread, or IRS). The FI index is a composite measure of the development of financial 
institutions (practically the banking sector) embracing both their size, efficiency and accessibility (see 
below). In contrast to the FI index, the PCB considers only the size, whereas the IRS only the efficiency, 
of banking activity. We pull these financial development measures into our regressions one-by-one. 
Therefore, following the financial development measures, equation (1) has three sub-specifications.9     
With respect to the deep-rooted development variable, five different measures are considered: the 
first, the third and the sixth level of the ethnolinguistic fractionalization index of Desmet et al. (2012) 
(ELF1, ELF3, ELF6); the ancestry adjusted state-history (state history, or SHadj) of Putterman and 
Weil (2010); and the weighted genetic distance from the USA (genetic distance, or GDw) in Spolaore 
and Wacziarg (2013).10 
The covariates (conditioning) set consists of the following usual policy, structural and production 
factor measures: 1. the first-order lag of the dependent variable (ln(y)(-1)), 2. the (logged) gross 
enrolment ratio into tertiary education (ln(TER)), 3. the (logged) gross fixed capital formation 
(ln(GFCF)), 4. the inflation rate (Inflation), 5. natural resource rents (NR_rents), 6. the quality of 
                                                          
9 We also performed the estimations when private credit and interest rate spread were jointly included in the model so that 
only private credit was interacted with the DRD(#) quantile dummy. Moreover, we also considered other size- and efficiency-
based measures of financial development to which the growth-finance literature traditionally resorts to. These were the 
average overhead costs of banks, the domestic (i.e. private and public) credit to the private sector and the deposit money 
banks’ assets. The results, available upon request, are very similar to the default ones and do not offer any further insight 
into the growth-finance nexus. 
10 The estimations were also performed using the unadjusted state history and the unweighted genetic distance indexes of 
the same sources. The results are very similar to the default ones and available upon request.   
10 
 
institutions measured by the arithmetic average of the six Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
and 7. a period dummy to control for the external shock caused by the global economic crisis 
(GlobalCrisis: 1 for 2009-11, 0 otherwise). Other policy and structural variables were also considered 
but they proved to be insignificant (see below).   
Our emphasis is placed on the FD*DRD(#) interaction term. Namely, its introduction into the 
model splits the sample arbitrarily into two parts depending on the effect of financial development on 
output per capita. In the lower # percent of the sample distribution of the deep-rooted development 
variable, where DRD(#)=0, the marginal effect of financial development on GDP is 1β , which is 
simply the main effect of FD in equation (1). On the other hand, in the upper (100 – #) percent of the 
sample distribution, where DRD(#)=1, the marginal effect of financial development on economic 
output is 1 3( )β β+ , that is, the sum of FD’s main effect and indirect effect conditioned on the deep 
root of economic development. If the coefficient of the interaction term differs from zero, there is a 
clear break in the growth-finance relationship based on the underlying deep-rooted development 
variable. Therefore, in our analysis we primarily focus on the t-test of the 3β  coefficient. The 
estimations are performed for three threshold values, # = 30, 50 and 70; that is, we split the sample 
at the 30th, 50th and 70th percentile of the DRD threshold variable.    
We estimate equation (1) for each FD-DRD-DRD(#) combination, which sums up to 45 different 
model specifications. The default estimation method used is the system GMM developed by Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).11 The right-hand-side variables in equation (1) are 
considered to be endogenous to contemporary idiosyncratic shocks, with the exception of the global 
crisis dummy, the deep-rooted development variable and the natural resource rents, all of which are 
treated as strictly exogenous regressors.  
The relatively low number of cross-sectional observations in our sample suggests applying GMM 
in the following way. First, we prefer first-step GMM over two-step GMM. Second, we constrain the 
number of GMM instruments by setting their maximum lag order to 2 at the (transformed) first-
differenced equation.12 Two-step GMM is asymptotically more efficient than one-step GMM. 
Nevertheless, the estimation of the optimal weighting matrix, that is, the second moments of the 
empirical moment conditions, is a source of considerable uncertainty with regard to the finite sample 
superiority of the former over the latter. In fact, Monte Carlo studies tend to show that, on the one 
hand, two-step GMM does not outperform one-step GMM in terms of accuracy and precision, while, 
on the other hand, the supposed efficiency gain of going one-step further is tiny in moderate samples 
                                                          
11 The system GMM estimations are conducted by the xtabond2 command, developed by Roodman (2009a), in Stata. 
12 We exploit the following moment conditions: 
( 2) | 0i t itE x tε− ∆ =   and ( 1) | 0  t 3i t itE x tε− ∆ = ∀ ≥  , where x  is the vector 
of the right-hand-side variables in equation (1) with the exception of ‘GlobalCrisis’, ‘DRD’ and ‘NR_rents’. 
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and almost non-existent in such small samples as ours (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Windmeijer, 2005; 
Soto, 2009). The small sample size causes another serious problem at system GMM, the proliferation 
of instruments (Roodman, 2009b). Instrument proliferation has many costs (e.g., the overfitting of 
the endogenous variables and the low power of the Hansen test of instrument validity), and so its 
mitigation is highly recommended (ibid.).  To sum up, the containment of the number of instruments 
and the preference of one-step over two-step estimation are common in the (system) GMM literature 
in the case of small samples (e.g., Bond et al., 2001; Beck and Levine, 2004). Nevertheless, we check 
the robustness of the results with respect to the estimation methodology later. 
Another peculiarity of our GMM estimations is that in addition to the standard system GMM 
instruments (i.e., the lagged level/differenced right-hand-side variables), we also involve additional 
external non-GMM instruments, which are traditionally used to control for the exogenous evolution 
of financial development, in the instrument matrix. These instrumental variables are related to the 
legacies of empires and legal origin (see, e.g., La Porta et al., 2008; Grosjean, 2011). The imperial 
legacy instruments are composed of dummy variables which indicate the imperial affiliation of post-
socialist countries in 1900.13 The legal origin instruments embrace a French legal origin dummy from 
La Porta et al. (2008) and a ‘CIS&MNG’ dummy (1 for Mongolia and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, 0 otherwise) to control for the potentially differential effect of Russian legal 
origin on financial development discussed in Harper and McNulty (2008). 
 
Data & Sample 
This section introduces the data and the related descriptive statistics. Table 1 summarizes the basic 
information with regard to the notations, units of measurement and data sources.14 We briefly 
comment only on those variables which might not be evident from the table. Natural resource rents 
are intended to cover the rents coming from the oil and natural gas sectors. Rents are understood as 
the estimated revenue in excess of the costs of extraction including the normal return on capital.  
The ELF# index is a fractionalization index typically used in the literature to gauge the probability 
that, when choosing any two members of the society randomly, they will belong to different 
(ethnolinguistic) groups.15 The index is maximized (at one) when each member of the society belongs 
to a different group. In contrast, it takes on a value of zero in a completely homogenous population. 
                                                          
13 We use separate dummies for the Austro-Hungarian, German, Russian and Ottoman empires. The independent countries 
and the countries not affiliated to any of the previous four empires in 1900 constitute the control group. In those cases, when 
the present territory of a country was partitioned by more than one empire in 1900, the respective dummies are set to 1 
jointly. In other words, the dummies are not adjusted according to the proportion of territory ruled by the individual empires. 
For example, in the case of Poland, the Austro-Hungarian, the German and the Russian empire dummies are both set to 1. 
For more details on the imperial legacy and legal origin dummies, see table 1 in the online appendix. 
14 Although we focus on the banking sector, this section provides some data on stock market development as well. 
15 The index is calculated as follows: 2
1
# 1 i N iiELF s
=
=
= −∑ , where si is the population share of group i and N is the number 
of groups (see Alessina et al., 2003).  
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Desmet et al. (2012) measure diversity at different levels of linguistic aggregation. Using language 
trees, they distinguish 15 different levels. The highest aggregation level (level 1) embraces the deepest 
cleavages in a society, which cleavages go back several thousand years. Moving down the 
aggregation level, the measured diversity captures finer and finer ethnolinguistic ruptures. In 
transition countries, fractionalization practically does not change beyond the sixth aggregation level, 
which accounts for our decision not to consider lower ELF# levels in our analysis. 
State history measures the exposure to an organized state framework from 1 to 1950 AD. It provides 
a composite value on the existence, independence and territorial coverage of statehood within the 
present borders of a country (Bockstette et al., 2002). The index is maximized at one when an 
independent (domestic) state power controlled the majority of the present territory of a country without 
any major break during the first two millennia. On the other hand, if no organized statehood existed in 
that period, the index swings to the other extreme, zero. We use ancestry-adjusted state history as per 
Putterman and Weil (2010), which is calculated as the weighted average of the (1-1950 AD) state 
history of the year-1500 AD  origin countries of the current population.16 The adjustment according to 
ancestry controls for the large post-1500AD population flows and the imputed heterogeneity with 
respect to the historical exposure to organized statehood. Nonetheless, we have to stress that in most 
cases unadjusted state history falls close to the adjusted one in transition countries because of the 
relatively minor population movements in the region after 1500 AD. 
Genetic distance is intended to capture the genealogical relatedness of countries. It is a “molecular 
clock” which approximates the time elapsed since two populations have separated, that is, the distance 
from their most recent common ancestor (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009). After their split, the human 
genomes of two populations start to drift away either randomly or as a result of natural selection. The 
genetic distance data of Spolaore and Wacziarg (based on the original data collection of Cavalli-
Sforza et al., 1994) consider exclusively the random drifts by focusing only on differences in neutral 
genes and neglecting those related to genes responsible for fitness and survival. This is motivated by 
the authors’ intention to use genetic distance as a composite measure of differences in the vertically 
transmitted beliefs, traits and habits which might emerge as barriers to the diffusion of ideas and 
technologies.17 We use the FST index of genetic distance to the USA from Spolaore and Wacziarg 
                                                          
16 More precisely, the X migration matrix is multiplied by the vector of unadjusted state history indexes (sh) of origin 
countries from the right. The rows in the migration matrix contain the proportions of year-1500 origin countries of countries’ 
present population. The unadjusted state history index, with a discount factor of 5 percent, is calculated as follows: 
( ) ( )39 390 01.05 / 1.05 50t ttt tsh s− −= == ∗ ∗∑ ∑ , where st is the state history variable of the t-th half-century going backward in time 
from 1950 to 0. For example, t=0 refers to 1950-1901 and t=1 refers to 1851-1900 etc. The st state history variable takes on 
a maximum value of 50 if the majority of the present territory of the country (i.e., >50%) was ruled by domestically located, 
independent government in the given half-century. For more details, consult Putterman and Weil (2010).  
17 As Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013, pp.342) put it: “… since genetic distance is based on neutral change, it is not meant 
to capture differences in specific genetic traits that can directly matter for survival and fitness. Hence, we emphasize that 
empirical work using genetic distance provides no evidence for an effect of specific genes on income or productivity. … 
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(2013), weighted by the ancestral composition of the countries’ present population. The theoretical 
minimum of FST (i.e., zero) corresponds to the case when the allele (i.e., the variant of a gene) 
distributions are identical across two populations. In contrast, it reaches its maximum (i.e., one) in 
the hypothetical case when all individuals within each population have the same alleles (gene variants 
at the given loci) and these alleles differ completely across the two populations. The higher the 
differences in the allele distributions across two populations, the larger the genetic distance between 
them is (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2014). The selection of the USA as the point of comparison is 
motivated by its technological frontier status. Genetic distance is calculated at the population 
(ethnolinguistic group) level. However, countries are usually inhabited by more than one 
ethnolinguistic group. To take account of population diversity, we resort to the ancestry-weighted 
genetic distance of transition countries to the USA, which gives the expected genetic distance between 
two randomly chosen individuals, one from the USA and from the underlying transition country.18   
 The FI index is a composite measure of the development of financial institutions including banks, 
insurance companies, pension funds and mutual funds (Svirydzenka, 2016). It is the average of the 
depth of financial intermediation by financial institutions, the efficiency of financial institutions and 
the accessibility to their services. The index is normalized to the interval of [0; 1] and is so constructed 
that higher FI means higher overall development of financial institutions.19     
 Our panel data covers the period between 1993 and 2014 and includes 26 transition countries. These 
countries are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, FYR Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan and 
Ukraine. The descriptive statistics, tailored to the major regions, and the correlation matrix of the annual 
observations are depicted in tables 2 and 3. Furthermore, in figure 1 we present the distribution of deep-
rooted development variables in the post-socialist region. Note that they are fixed in time. Figure 2 
introduces the evolution of average financial development in the main transition regions.   
                                                          
Rather, it can serve as evidence for the importance of intergenerationally transmitted traits, including traits that are 
transmitted culturally from one generation to the next.” 
18 The weighted index is calculated as follows: 
, ,TC i USA j ij
i j
GDw s s GD= × ×∑∑ , where GDi,j is the FST genetic distance 
between (ethnolinguistic) group i and j, while ,TC is and ,USA js are the share of group i/j in transition country TC and the 
USA, respectively.  
19 Technically, the FI index is the weighted average of the depth of intermediation (FID), the efficiency (FIE) and the 
accessibility (FIA) sub-indexes related to financial institutions. These sub-indexes are constructed from several indicators 
of the underlying dimension of financial development just in the same way as the FI index. The FID sub-index comprises 
the amount of private credit and insurance premiums and the assets of pension funds and mutual funds. The FIE sub-
index embraces, among others, the return on assets and the overhead costs of financial institutions and the interest rate 
spread. Finally, the FIA sub-index involves the bank branches and the ATMs per 100,000 adults. 
In the original dataset, both missing financial sectors/markets and missing data are encoded by zero. As the banking sector 
was certainly not missing in any transition countries, neither at the onset of market economy transformation nor later, we 
treated the FI=0 observations as missing in our sample. There are six such data points between 1994 and 2014 (GEO – 
1994, KGZ – 1994, BIH – 1994, TJK – 1994-96).   
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Table 1. Data description and sources 
Variable Notation Unit Data source Notes 
GDP per worker y USD  
(PPP, 2011 prices) 
PWT9.0 Own calculation based on the series of 
‘rgdpna’1 and ‘emp’2. 
Enrollment ratio into 
tertiary education 
TER %  UIS gross ratio, both sexes 
Gross fixed capital 
formation 
GFCF % of GDP WDI  
Inflation Inflation % WEO Change of consumer prices (annual average) 
Natural resource rents NR_rents % of GDP WDI Sum of ‘Oil rents’ and ‘Natural gas rents’ 





WGI index [-2.5 ; 2.5] 4  Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (World Bank) 
Arithmetic average of the 6 WGIs 
Ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization  
ELF# index [0 ; 1] 4 Desmet et al. (2012) Aggregation level # = 1, 3 and 6 
Ancestry-adjusted state 
history 
SHadj index [0 ; 1] 4 X: World Migration matrix, 
1500-2000 (v.1.1)  
sh: State Antiquity Index 
(v.3.1) (‘statehistn05v3’)  
Putterman and Weil (2010)3 
Own calculation based on Putterman and 
Weil (2010): 𝑋𝑋 ∗ 𝑠𝑠ℎ���, where 𝑠𝑠ℎ��� is the vector 
of the sh state antiquity (history) indexes 
for the period 1-1950AD with a discount 
factor of 5% and normalized to [0 ; 1].   
Weighted genetic 
distance to the USA 
GDw index [0; 10,000] 4 
 
Spolaore and Wacziarg 
(2013) (‘fst_weighted_usa’) 
The original weighted FST index (∈ [0; 1]) 
is multiplied by 10,000 in Spolaore and 
Wacziarg (2013) in order to facilitate the 
readability of estimated coefficients 
Private credit by deposit 
money banks 
PCB % of GDP GFDD  
Interest rate spread IRS percentage points GFDD Bank lending-deposit spread 
Development of financial 
institutions 
FI index [0 ; 1] 4 
 
Svirydzenka (2016) Composite index of the size, efficiency and 
accessibility of financial institutions. Zeros 
in the original dataset are treated as 
unavailable observations.  
Stock market capitalization STC % of GDP GFDD Value of shares listed at the stock exchange 
Notes: 1 Real GDP using national-accounts growth rates, 2 Number of persons engaged, 3 The Migration matrix and the State Antiquity Index 
are available on Louis Putterman’s website (http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Faculty/Louis_Putterman/), 4 Government 
Quality/ Fractionalization /State history /Genetic Distance /Financial Development increases with the index. 
Abbreviations: PWT9.0 – Penn World Table 9.0 (Feenstra et al., 2015), UIS – UNESCO, Institute for Statistic, WDI – World Development 
Indicators (The World Bank), WEO – World Economic Outlook (April 2016, IMF), GFDD – Global Financial Development Database (June 




According to each measure, financial development is at the highest level in Central Europe, 
followed by South-East Europe. The financial sector of East-European, Caucasus and Central Asian 
countries is equally developed on the regional average but lag behind their Western post-socialist 
counterparts significantly. The amount of private credit and the overall development of financial 
institutions are considerably lower, while the lending-deposit bank interest rate spread is substantially 
higher in the Soviet successor states. This relative ranking of transition regions characterized the 
whole period under consideration (figure 2). 
Regional patterns are also observable with respect to the deep-rooted development variables 
(figure 1). Ethnolinguistic fractionalization at each aggregation level tends to be higher in the eastern 
part than in the western part of the post-socialist bloc. The same relation holds for (ancestry-adjusted) 
state history but in the opposite direction. People are more accustomed to an organized state 
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framework in Central and South-East Europe than in most post-Soviet countries. Genetic distance 
from the USA is expected to increase with longitude based on the supposition that the Asian 
population is less related to the US population than the Central-European one is. This premise largely 
holds, but a few outlier countries, notably Hungary, the Baltics and Tajikistan, obscure the big picture 
(see figure 1).  
Regarding pairwise correlations, we discuss only the relationship of financial development and 
deep-rooted development variables. First, state history is negatively correlated with ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization and genetic distance to the USA. Indeed, this is the direction one might reasonably 
expect. In more diverse populations, which are also more polarized up to a certain level of 
fractionalization, social conflicts are more prevalent, making it harder to establish and cement 
centralized state power. Furthermore, larger genetic distance obstructs the adoption of those 
institutions and both legal and tacit societal rules of developed western countries which facilitate the 
solidification of a centralized state framework.  
Financial development is negatively correlated with ethnolinguistic fractionalization. In more 
diverse transition economies, the amount of private credit and stock market capitalization tend to be 
lower, while the lending-deposit interest rate spread tends to be higher. State history is positively 
related to the development of the banking sector, matching the result of Ang (2013). From among the 
financial development measures, genetic distance correlates significantly only with stock market 
capitalization. The relationship between them is negative, and this will be of importance during the 
discussion of our results. Finally, the four financial development measures move in the same 
direction, meaning that the development of the banking sector and the capital markets have gone hand 
in hand in transition countries. 
Annual data are noisy because of business cycles. To address this problem, the growth literature 
operates with multiple-year – typically 5-year – periods. However, time series on transition countries 
are naturally constrained to the last two and a half decades. In order to maintain a reasonably long 
time dimension for our panel sample, we work with 3-year periods (1994-96, 1997-99, 2000-02, 
2003-05, 2006-08, 2009-11, 2012-14), which enables t=7 time observations. Thus, our 3-year panel 
sample consists of 182 data points. Most of the variables in regression (1) are period averages, 
meaning that at time t they take the average value of the underlying period. The only exceptions are, 
on the one hand, the time-invariant deep-rooted development variables and, on the other hand, the 
(log) GDP per worker, with the GDP per worker at time t referring to the end-year of the underlying 
period.20        
 
                                                          
20 In fact, the reason for the inclusion of the year 1993 in the dataset is to already have observations on the lag dependent 
variable in the first 3-year period.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics tailored to the major country groups (annual data: 1994-2014) 
 
   CEB (=8 countries)1 SEE (=7 countries)2 EE + Caucasus (=7 countries)3 Central Asia (=4 countries)4 
  Obs Mean SD Min Max Obs Mean SD Min Max Obs Mean SD Min Max Obs Mean SD Min Max 








t TER 166 54.1 19.7 17.0 88.5 131 38.0 15.3 10.2 71.3 132 47.9 20.0 16.8 91.0 70 34.3 13.5 12.8 64.3 
GFCF 164 24.8 4.7 14.3 37.1 144 22.4 6.4 5.4 40.5 147 23.7 7.5 2.6 57.7 83 22.3 8.0 7.4 48.4 
Inflation 164 6.6 7.5 -1.2 47.7 140 21.0 92.6 -1.6 1061.2 146 102.7 498.6 -8.5 5273.4 84 51.9 174.1 0.9 1402.0 
WGI 128 0.778 0.181 0.245 1.214 112 -0.143 0.348 -1.222 0.447 112 -0.587 0.297 -1.099 0.391 64 -0.671 0.427 -1.659 0.211 






 PCB 166 41.8 20.5 6.7 102.5 138 33.2 18.6 2.8 73.3 146 18.7 15.5 0.9 73.9 79 17.9 13.8 3.7 57.2 
IRS 143 5.41 3.03 0.26 24.18 133 10.62 9.52 2.42 58.92 133 13.41 14.12 0.03 91.76 57 19.20 11.84 4.67 59.75 
FI  168 0.462 0.125 0.127 0.743 146 0.381 0.139 0.169 0.693 146 0.248 0.111 0.078 0.551 80 0.224 0.127 0.072 0.576 







 ELF1 168 0.101 0.151 0.000 0.455 147 0.079 0.070 0.000 0.172 147 0.161 0.156 0.003 0.435 84 0.334 0.187 0.027 0.501 
ELF3 168 0.239 0.183 0.023 0.531 147 0.258 0.150 0.078 0.566 147 0.307 0.178 0.126 0.574 84 0.466 0.192 0.162 0.634 
ELF6 168 0.272 0.181 0.060 0.595 147 0.297 0.151 0.087 0.566 147 0.412 0.142 0.174 0.589 84 0.542 0.152 0.331 0.701 
SHadj 168 0.487 0.096 0.338 0.597 147 0.576 0.062 0.467 0.652 147 0.468 0.065 0.397 0.581 84 0.454 0.077 0.336 0.528 
GDw 168 668.7 299.0 318.8 1100.4 126 493.6 29.3 457.7 530.1 147 521.1 195.7 391.5 989.6 84 717.3 310.9 197.0 1003.7 
Notes: SD is standard deviation. Data on genetic distance (GDw) are not available for Bosnia and Hercegovina. In the case of the FI index, zeros in the original dataset are treated as unavailable observations (GEO:1994, 
KGZ:1994, BIH:1994, TJK:1994-96). 1 Central Europe and the Baltics (CZE, HUN, POL, SVK, SVN, EST, LVA, LTU), 2 South-East Europe (ALB, BGR, BIH, HRV, MKD, ROM, SRB), 3 Eastern-Europe and the Caucasus 
(BLR, MDA, RUS, UKR, ARM, AZE, GEO), 4 (KAZ, KGZ, MNG, TJK)   
Table 3. Correlation matrix (all countries, annual data: 1994-2014) 
 y TER GFCF Inflation WGI NR_rents PCB IRS FI STC ELF1 ELF3 ELF6 SHadj 
TER 0.5482* 1.000             
GFCF 0.1188* 0.1702* 1.000            
Inflation -0.1667* -0.110 -0.032 1.000           
WGI 0.6950* 0.3822* 0.1344* -0.2650* 1.000          
NR_rents -0.046 -0.067 0.072 0.015 -0.3671* 1.000         
PCB 0.7286* 0.5656* 0.1497* -0.1324* 0.5994* -0.1988* 1.000        
IRS -0.4856* -0.3060* -0.2780* 0.4225* -0.4112* -0.011 -0.4310* 1.000       
FI  0.8108* 0.5831* 0.1931* -0.1445* 0.7383* -0.1970* 0.8742* -0.5154* 1.000      
STC 0.4296* 0.2319* 0.119 -0.088 0.1774* 0.115 0.2725* -0.2726* 0.3815* 1.000     
ELF1 -0.2849* -0.2210* -0.084 0.014 -0.2941* 0.3881* -0.1839* 0.101 -0.3069* -0.052 1.000    
ELF3 -0.3957* -0.2371* -0.1299* -0.019 -0.3290* 0.1700* -0.2249* 0.064 -0.3774* -0.1658* 0.6874* 1.000   
ELF6 -0.4450* -0.094 -0.105 0.001 -0.4677* 0.1578* -0.2220* 0.1556* -0.4282* -0.1729* 0.5555* 0.8689* 1.000  
SHadj 0.1936* -0.1828* -0.1213* -0.019 0.115 -0.1695* 0.1237* -0.056 0.2459* -0.017 -0.3324* -0.4507* -0.5948* 1.000 
GDw 0.027 0.042 0.1734* -0.034 0.1900* 0.2820* 0.001 -0.068 0.003 -0.1791* 0.2735* 0.2749* 0.2321* -0.2592* 
Notes: * significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Figure 1. The distribution of deep-rooted development variables in post-socialist countries 
     
 
      
 
 
Source: Own graphs. For the data source, see table 1. 
Notes: Black columns depict CEB and SEE countries, while grey columns depict Eastern European, Caucasus and Central Asian countries. 
Genetic Distance is not available for Bosnia and Hercegovina.  
 
  Figure 2. The evolution of financial development in major transition regions 
        
Source: Own graphs. For the data source, see table 1. 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































We present the estimation results of equation (1) in tables 4A-E. The specifications in each table 
include one of the following deep-rooted development variables: ethnolinguistic fractionalization at 
the 1st, 3rd and 6th levels of aggregation, adjusted state history and weighted genetic distance to the 
United States. Each table consists of three parts, which vary only in the financial development measure. 
For each FD-DRD combination four estimations are presented: the linear (no-break) specification and 
the nonlinear (or piecewise-linear) models broken at the 30th, 50th and 70th percentiles of the DRD 
threshold variable. Thus, each table contains 12 regressions. Before proceeding to the discussion of 
the nonlinear estimations, we can derive some general conclusions based on these tables.  
First, the tests on the first and second order residual autocorrelation of the (transformed) first-
differenced equations (AR(1) and AR(2)) show that model specification is correct and the GMM 
moment conditions are not violated because of autocorrelated idiosyncratic shocks in equation (1). 
The Hansen test results in a 100 percent p-value in each case, which clearly indicates that the test is 
artificially deflated by the number of instruments still being too large and so cannot be trusted. 
Nevertheless, the Sargan tests and basic economic reasoning suggest the validity of our instrument 
set.21,22 This suggestion is further corroborated by the Hansen tests of those estimations which operate 
with very much constrained GMM instruments in the robustness checks (see below).   
Second, the coefficients of the usual covariates have the expected sign and are mostly significant 
with the sole exception of the human capital proxy, the tertiary enrolment ratio. Another observation 
is that the significance of these traditional growth determinants deteriorates somewhat when the 
interest rate spread is the preferred financial development measure.  
Third, the direct growth effects of financial development, ancestry and diversity are in line with 
the literature. Larger fractionalization and genetic distance decrease economic growth, whereas 
longer state history increases it. These results are profoundly established on a global scale in the 
seminal papers of Alesina et al. (2003), Desmet et al. (2012), Putterman and Weil (2010) and Spolaore 
and Wacziarg (2013). We can therefore conclude that evidence from transition economies is in line 
with conventional wisdom in the economic development literature. Notwithstanding, two remarks are 
worth noting. First, the negative effect of ethnolinguistic fractionalization on growth gains 
significance only at lower aggregation levels. This parallels the results of Desmet et al (2012). 
                                                          
21 Recall that only those variables which are hardly impacted by the idiosyncratic shocks to economic output 
(‘GlobalCrises’, ‘DRD’ and ‘NR_rents’) are treated as being strictly exogenous. Similarly, reverse causation is certainly 
not an issue for legal origin and imperial affiliation dummies. 
22 The Sargan test statistic is equivalent to the objective function of 1-step GMM when disturbances are bound to be 
spherical, that is, non-correlated and homoskedastic (Sargan, 1958). If this assumption on the error structure holds, the 
Hansen test (Hansen, 1982) and the Sargan test are asymptotically equivalent. However, if disturbances are non-spherical, 
the Sargan statistic is an inconsistent estimate of the (weighted) moment conditions, and so is not capable of assessing 
instrument validity in a reliable way. Nevertheless, as it is not plagued by instrument proliferation, in contrast to the 
Hansen test, it is indicative in our case (Roodman, 2009a).      
19 
 
Second, in all but one FD-DRD specification, the DRD variable is significant only when the potential 
nonlinear effect of finance in the form of interactions is taken into account. This suggests that 
artificially imputed linearity might obscure the real effect of these deep-rooted development variables. 
With respect to the effect of financial development on growth in the linear model, both the PCB and 
the IRS coefficients have negative signs and the latter tends to be mostly significant whereas the former 
does not. This is in line with the results of the finance literature on transition economies, according to 
which the interest rate spread is a crucial dimension of financial development, but the amount of private 
credit less so. Thus, our results confirm the widespread notion that what we need is better, and not 
necessarily more, finance. Concerning the results on the FD=FI specifications, the overall effect of 
financial development on growth is significantly negative, which is striking. However, this result is not 
robust to the estimation methodology, and so we do not pay any particular significance to it (see later).   
In table 4A, we find that ethnolinguistic fractionalization at the highest aggregation level (ELF1) 
is not a relevant threshold variable for the growth-finance nexus: the FD*ELF1(#) coefficients are 
always insignificant at standard levels, usually with very high p-values. The estimated effects of 
financial development in the bottom and the upper ELF1 regimes fall close to each other in the 
majority of cases. However, there are some exceptions when the effect of financial development 
seems to switch  statistical significance, or even change sign between the two regimes.23 Of course, 
even in these controversial cases the ultimate decision with regard to the differential effect of finance 
on growth hinges upon the statistical significance of the interaction term. 
The results on ELF3 and ELF6 in tables 4B and 4C suggest that ethnolinguistic fractionalization 
tends to condition the effect of financial development on growth in a decisive way. There is a clear 
break in the growth-finance nexus both along ELF3 and ELF6. When private credit or the overall 
development of financial institutions (FI) are the preferred financial development measures, the 
FD*DRD(#) interactions are relevant with a positive sign when splitting the sample at the 30th and 50th 
percentiles of ethnolinguistic fractionalization. As a result, the effects of private credit and the overall 
development of financial institutions change pattern from being significantly negative in the lower 
percentiles to being neutral in the upper ones. Indeed, the calculated FD_upper coefficients are not 
statistically different from zero, except in one case. A similar structural break in the effect of interest 
rate spread is observable only at the lowest aggregation level of ethnolinguistic fractionalization. The 
                                                          
23 For example, at the “PCB_ELF1_70” specification the estimated effect of private credit in the bottom 70 percent of the 
sample distribution of ELF1 is negative 1ˆ( 0.0011)β = −  and significant at the 5 percent level. The interaction term 
estimates the PCB coefficient to be larger by 3ˆ0.0014( )β=  for the upper 30 percent of the distribution but the related t-
test shows the insignificance of this difference. Thus, theoretically, private credit exerts the same effect in the two regimes: 
1 1 3( )β β β= + . However, contrary to the case for the bottom regime, private credit with its estimated tiny effect 
1 3
ˆ ˆ( 0.0003)β β+ =  proves to be irrelevant in the upper regime. This contradiction is a statistical artifact relating to the 
indirect derivation of the FD_upper coefficient.  
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significant negative coefficient of the IRS*ELF6(#) interaction term when splitting the sample at the 
30th and 70th percentiles shows that the improvement of banking efficiency (i.e., a decrease in the 
interest rate spread) has larger growth reward in more fractionalized societies, at least when finer 
cleavages are considered. To sum up, larger ethnolinguistic fractionalization at lower aggregation levels 
improves the growth effect of financial development in post-socialist countries: on the one hand, it 
renders financial development less detrimental and, in fact, neutral when it comes to size-based or 
overall financial development measures and, on the other hand, it reinforces the beneficial effect of 
finance when it comes to the efficiency-based measure, the interest rate spread.  
Looking at state history (table 4D), there are significant breaks in the growth-finance relationship 
at standard levels only when financial development is measured either by private credit or the FI 
index. In these cases, the FD*SHadj(#) interactions have negative coefficients and are significant at 
the 5 percent level when the sample is split at the 50th percentile of sample distribution. On the other 
hand, the interactions have positive coefficients in the case of the interest rate spread but they are 
marginally insignificant at the 10 percent level. All in all, a longer state history is detrimental to the 
effect of financial development on growth. Indeed, the negative effect of overall development of 
financial institutions on economic output is more enhanced in the upper percentiles of the state history 
distribution. Private credit is growth-neutral with a relatively short state history, but becomes a 
growth-constraining factor when state history is too long. Moreover, the interest rate spread tends to 
lose significance with relatively long state history.  
 In table 4E, we report our results on the relevance of the (weighted) genetic distance to the United 
States. The interaction terms suggest conclusions similar to those for ethnolinguistic fractionalization. 
They have significant positive coefficients at each sample splitting when financial development is 
measured either by the amount of private credit or the FI index. Therefore, genetic distance improves 
the effect of financial development on growth by transforming both the overall financial development 
measure and the amount of private credit from growth-decreasing into growth-neutral factors. The case 
of IRS is less straightforward. On the one hand, the IRS*GDw(70) interaction is negative and 
statistically significant. This means that the effect of a one percentage point decrease in the interest rate 
spread is more positive for growth in countries belonging to the upper 30 percent of the sample 
distribution of genetic distance than in countries in the bottom 70 percent of the distribution. On the 
other hand, in the two other cases these interactions have positive but insignificant coefficients, which 
just correspond to the opposite of the previous threshold effect. To sum up, there is clear evidence on 
the existence of threshold effects in the growth-finance nexus along genetic distance according to which 




Table 4A. GMM estimation results – Ethnolinguistic fractionalization, aggregation level 1 
FD variable FI PCB IRS 
Break (percentile) Ø break 30th 50th 70th Ø break 30th 50th 70th Ø break 30th 50th 70th 
ln(y)(-1) 0.9273*** 0.9246*** 0.9264*** 0.9214*** 0.9085*** 0.9093*** 0.9103*** 0.9055*** 0.8669*** 0.8718*** 0.8655*** 0.8626*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(TER) 0.0193 0.0213 0.0184 0.0164 0.0043 0.0040 0.0032 0.0092 -0.0095 -0.0058 -0.0128 -0.0124 
 (0.433) (0.387) (0.460) (0.498) (0.854) (0.858) (0.888) (0.683) (0.637) (0.742) (0.539) (0.556) 
ln(GFCF) 0.0954** 0.0995** 0.1000** 0.0919** 0.0891* 0.0962** 0.0905** 0.0677* 0.0559 0.0505 0.0475 0.0579 
 (0.042) (0.030) (0.022) (0.023) (0.065) (0.019) (0.031) (0.083) (0.205) (0.255) (0.292) (0.217) 
Inflation -0.0007** -0.0007** -0.0007** -0.0007** -0.0007** -0.0007** -0.0007** -0.0007** -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0004 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.022) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.018) (0.282) (0.218) (0.315) (0.265) 
NR_rents 0.0033*** 0.0034*** 0.0033** 0.0033*** 0.0031** 0.0030** 0.0030** 0.0032*** 0.0042*** 0.0040*** 0.0042*** 0.0037*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
GlobalCrisis -0.0535*** -0.0529*** -0.0531*** -0.0545*** -0.0498*** -0.0491*** -0.0494*** -0.0507*** -0.0683*** -0.0678*** -0.0670*** -0.0644*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
WGI 0.0522* 0.0586** 0.0522* 0.0415 0.0416 0.0418 0.0412 0.0328 0.0444 0.0342 0.0436 0.0382 
 (0.060) (0.035) (0.073)  (0.144) (0.126) (0.117) (0.131) (0.225) (0.132) (0.298) (0.134) (0.187) 
FD -0.2372*** -0.2631*** -0.2433*** -0.2187** -0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0011** -0.0042* 0.0007 -0.0042 -0.0036 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.012) (0.146) (0.169) (0.141) (0.049) (0.085) (0.866) (0.184) (0.196) 
ELF1 -0.1293 -0.1458 -0.1423 -0.2178 -0.1182 -0.1163 -0.1119 -0.2184 -0.1248 -0.0796 -0.1037 -0.0421 
 (0.206) (0.226) (0.266) (0.213) (0.279) (0.330) (0.420) (0.209) (0.261) (0.493) (0.470) (0.764) 
FD*ELF1(30)  0.0318    0.0000    -0.0044   
  (0.549)    (0.963)    (0.194)   
FD*ELF1(50)   0.0178    -0.0001    -0.0008  
   (0.738)    (0.906)    (0.810)  
FD*ELF1(70)    0.1214    0.0014    -0.0029 
    (0.359)    (0.240)    (0.390) 
Sargan test (pv) 0.543 0.748 0.700 0.749 0.389 0.581 0.613 0.755 0.013 0.245 0.015 0.016 
Hansen test (pv) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) (pv) 0.106 0.107 0.105 0.104 0.095 0.095 0.093 0.099 0.071 0.074 0.076 0.081 
AR(2) (pv) 0.330 0.338 0.343 0.349 0.336 0.348 0.332 0.343 0.597 0.627 0.637 0.738 
n(instruments) 74 84 84 84 74 84 84 84 74 84 84 84 
n 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 161 161 161 161 
FD_upper  -0.2313*** -0.2254*** -0.0973  -0.0009 -0.0010 0.0003  -0.0037 -0.0049* -0.0065*** 
  (0.002) (0.006) (0.587)  (0.151) (0.225) (0.845)  (0.111) (0.091) (0.009) 
  For notes, see Table 4E. 
Table 4B. GMM estimation results - Ethnolinguistic fractionalization, aggregation level 3 
FD variable FI PCB IRS 
Break (percentile) Ø break 30th 50th 70th Ø break 30th 50th 70th Ø break 30th 50th 70th 
ln(y)(-1) 0.9250*** 0.9369*** 0.8805*** 0.9254*** 0.9139*** 0.9212*** 0.9056*** 0.9309*** 0.8550*** 0.8580*** 0.8542*** 0.8638*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(TER) 0.0203 0.0239 0.0213 0.0069 0.0077 0.0061 0.0094 0.0085 -0.0133 -0.0151 -0.0110 0.0096 
 (0.447) (0.386) (0.457) (0.807) (0.759) (0.810) (0.711) (0.733) (0.544) (0.500) (0.607) (0.685) 
ln(GFCF) 0.1094** 0.0845* 0.0956** 0.0731* 0.1002** 0.0866** 0.0909** 0.0611 0.0635 0.0739 0.0869** 0.0951** 
 (0.022) (0.065) (0.030) (0.092) (0.038) (0.024) (0.035) (0.144) (0.158) (0.120) (0.022) (0.030) 
Inflation -0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0007** -0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0007** -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.020) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.022) (0.023) (0.425) (0.433) (0.425) (0.272) 
NR_rents 0.0029** 0.0026** 0.0031*** 0.0029** 0.0026** 0.0024** 0.0025*** 0.0023** 0.0039*** 0.0038*** 0.0039*** 0.0035*** 
 (0.011) (0.028) (0.001) (0.013) (0.015) (0.029) (0.007) (0.049) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
GlobalCrisis -0.0542*** -0.0565*** -0.0567*** -0.0543*** -0.0483*** -0.0498*** -0.0506*** -0.0463*** -0.0658*** -0.0659*** -0.0641*** -0.0665*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
WGI 0.0508 0.0519** 0.0339 0.0312 0.0420 0.0388 0.0214 0.0252 0.0436 0.0403 0.0464 0.0509* 
 (0.101) (0.031) (0.219) (0.381) (0.157) (0.162) (0.404) (0.409) (0.206) (0.206) (0.126) (0.080) 
FD  -0.2091** -0.3303*** -0.1631* -0.2284*** -0.0010 -0.0019*** -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0062*** -0.0063** -0.0056** -0.0023 
 (0.019) (0.006) (0.057) (0.007) (0.101) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.030) (0.023) (0.432) 
ELF3 -0.0888 -0.1679 -0.3313* -0.2413 -0.0783 -0.1473 -0.2839* -0.2009 -0.1080 -0.1052 -0.1071 0.0489 
 (0.289) (0.101) (0.057) (0.150) (0.381) (0.178) (0.057) (0.140) (0.244) (0.302) (0.308) (0.591) 
FD*ELF3(30)  0.1333**    0.0013*    0.0001   
  (0.040)    (0.064)    (0.962)   
FD*ELF3(50)   0.2875**    0.0026**    0.0002  
   (0.034)    (0.015)    (0.954)  
FD*ELF3(70)    0.1919    0.0018*    -0.0059 
    (0.195)    (0.079)    (0.129) 
Sargan test (pv) 0.141 0.538 0.377 0.471 0.100 0.338 0.506 0.592 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.008 
Hansen test (pv) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) (pv) 0.102 0.101 0.093 0.101 0.095 0.090 0.103 0.097 0.056 0.055 0.057 0.076 
AR(2) (pv) 0.318 0.282 0.264 0.319 0.327 0.301 0.290 0.289 0.808 0.837 0.810 0.715 
n(instruments) 74 84 84 84 74 84 84 84 74 84 84 84 
n 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 161 161 161 161 
FD_upper  -0.1970* 0.1244 -0.0365  -0.0006 0.0006 -0.0002  -0.0062*** -0.0054 -0.0082** 
  (0.068) (0.460) (0.826)  (0.390) (0.544) (0.840)  (0.007) (0.110) (0.013) 
  For notes, see Table 4E. 
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Table 4C. GMM estimation results - Ethnolinguistic fractionalization, aggregation level 6 
FD variable FI PCB IRS 
Break (percentile) Ø break 30th 50th 70th Ø break 30th 50th 70th Ø break 30th 50th 70th 
ln(y)(-1) 0.9111*** 0.8961*** 0.8790*** 0.9101*** 0.8969*** 0.8851*** 0.8869*** 0.9032*** 0.8523*** 0.8823*** 0.8572*** 0.8597*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(TER) 0.0318 0.0373 0.0355 0.0288 0.0139 0.0178 0.0267 0.0123 -0.0007 0.0079 -0.0045 0.0251 
 (0.234) (0.191) (0.197) (0.282) (0.592) (0.505) (0.307) (0.644) (0.976) (0.730) (0.848) (0.340) 
ln(GFCF) 0.0981** 0.0801* 0.0907** 0.0938** 0.0880** 0.0679 0.0732* 0.0892** 0.0559 0.0937** 0.0781* 0.0696 
 (0.023) (0.071) (0.033) (0.041) (0.040) (0.126) (0.055) (0.049) (0.208) (0.026) (0.064) (0.119) 
Inflation -0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0004 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.364) (0.128) (0.405) (0.220) 
NR_rents 0.0030*** 0.0028** 0.0033*** 0.0030*** 0.0028** 0.0027** 0.0030*** 0.0026** 0.0038*** 0.0041*** 0.0036*** 0.0035*** 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.000) (0.008) (0.011) (0.018) (0.001) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
GlobalCrisis -0.0528*** -0.0549*** -0.0512*** -0.0535*** -0.0507*** -0.0540*** -0.0484*** -0.0511*** -0.0666*** -0.0719*** -0.0670*** -0.0689*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
WGI 0.0475 0.0528* 0.0552** 0.0437 0.0374 0.0390 0.0442* 0.0327 0.0389 0.0205 0.0322 0.0471 
 (0.136) (0.054) (0.042) (0.162) (0.238) (0.161) (0.082) (0.296) (0.253) (0.550) (0.332) (0.108) 
FD -0.2042** -0.2817*** -0.2541*** -0.2036** -0.0007 -0.0019*** -0.0020*** -0.0010 -0.0059*** 0.0034 -0.0058*** -0.0017 
 (0.025) (0.003) (0.004) (0.023) (0.361) (0.003) (0.002) (0.106) (0.003) (0.420) (0.009) (0.567) 
ELF6 -0.1368 -0.2813* -0.3606** -0.1843 -0.1198 -0.2771* -0.2805* -0.1661 -0.1234 0.0425 -0.1080 -0.0097 
 (0.171) (0.074) (0.024) (0.159) (0.265) (0.067) (0.054) (0.191) (0.231) (0.687) (0.295) (0.919) 
FD*ELF6(30)  0.2043**    0.0023**    -0.0084**   
  (0.042)    (0.012)    (0.021)   
FD*ELF6(50)   0.2797**    0.0022**    -0.0004  
   (0.025)    (0.016)    (0.852)  
FD*ELF6(70)    0.0779    0.0009    -0.0049* 
    (0.433)    (0.232)    (0.069) 
Sargan test (pv) 0.202 0.439 0.522 0.362 0.154 0.335 0.554 0.354 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.004 
Hansen test (pv) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) (pv) 0.101 0.104 0.109 0.101 0.091 0.102 0.109 0.091 0.054 0.060 0.047 0.064 
AR(2) (pv) 0.297 0.248 0.271 0.304 0.296 0.248 0.251 0.302 0.751 0.836 0.852 0.644 
n(instruments) 74 84 84 84 74 84 84 84 74 84 84 84 
n 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 161 161 161 161 
FD_upper  -0.0774 0.0256 -0.1257  0.0004 0.0003 -0.0001  -0.0050** -0.0063*** -0.0066*** 
  (0.553) (0.873) (0.300)  (0.698) (0.810) (0.919)  (0.011) (0.005) (0.002) 
  For notes, see Table 4E. 
Table 4D. GMM estimation results - Adjusted state history  
FD variable FI PCB IRS 
Break (percentile) Ø break 30th 50th 70th Ø break 30th 50th 70th Ø break 30th 50th 70th 
ln(y)(-1) 0.9133*** 0.9132*** 0.8793*** 0.9173*** 0.8927*** 0.8985*** 0.8783*** 0.8990*** 0.8459*** 0.8537*** 0.8797*** 0.8368*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(TER) 0.0695** 0.0628** 0.0723** 0.0688** 0.0343 0.0376 0.0430 0.0377 0.0144 0.0311 0.0059 0.0086 
 (0.039) (0.030) (0.024) (0.047) (0.168) (0.159) (0.115) (0.145) (0.563) (0.224) (0.790) (0.721) 
ln(GFCF) 0.0922** 0.0917*** 0.1065*** 0.0704* 0.0680* 0.0640* 0.0780** 0.0538 0.0455 0.0558 0.0352 0.0646* 
 (0.014) (0.006) (0.001) (0.074) (0.083) (0.062) (0.014) (0.132) (0.261) (0.185) (0.339) (0.090) 
Inflation -0.0007** -0.0007** -0.0006** -0.0007** -0.0007** -0.0007** -0.0006** -0.0007** -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.330) (0.337) (0.378) (0.239) 
NR_rents 0.0037*** 0.0039*** 0.0035*** 0.0036*** 0.0032*** 0.0033*** 0.0032** 0.0031** 0.0045*** 0.0039*** 0.0044*** 0.0046*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GlobalCrisis -0.0488*** -0.0481*** -0.0473*** -0.0521*** -0.0487*** -0.0439*** -0.0478*** -0.0506*** -0.0696*** -0.0706*** -0.0761*** -0.0628*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
WGI 0.0823** 0.0767** 0.0910** 0.0830** 0.0574* 0.0591* 0.0669** 0.0598* 0.0565* 0.0509* 0.0371 0.0476* 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.017) (0.066) (0.051) (0.047) (0.073) (0.072) (0.085) (0.190) (0.071) 
FD -0.3935*** -0.2694** -0.1805 -0.3417*** -0.0011* -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0009 -0.0049** -0.0067** -0.0063** -0.0055*** 
 (0.001) (0.039) (0.218) (0.001) (0.074) (0.472) (0.861) (0.159) (0.033) (0.011) (0.016) (0.001) 
SHadj 0.4080** 0.6171** 0.8333** 0.5366** 0.2661 0.4897* 0.6041* 0.3991 0.2675 0.1100 0.0503 0.0602 
 (0.049) (0.031) (0.018) (0.046) (0.163) (0.061) (0.051) (0.114) (0.138) (0.532) (0.796) (0.781) 
FD*SHadj(30)  -0.1494    -0.0016*    0.0037   
  (0.153)    (0.078)    (0.137)   
FD*SHadj(50)   -0.2445**    -0.0020**    0.0033  
   (0.041)    (0.035)    (0.159)  
FD*SHadj(70)    -0.1062    -0.0011    0.0077 
    (0.218)    (0.182)    (0.131) 
Sargan test (pv) 0.632 0.836 0.890 0.866 0.319 0.678 0.690 0.617 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.027 
Hansen test (pv) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) (pv) 0.128 0.123 0.134 0.122 0.100 0.107 0.109 0.097 0.064 0.053 0.040 0.055 
AR(2) (pv) 0.304 0.316 0.367 0.284 0.269 0.282 0.296 0.247 0.586 0.503 0.498 0.940 
n(instruments) 74 84 84 84 74 84 84 84 74 84 84 84 
n 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 161 161 161 161 
FD_upper  -0.4188*** -0.4250*** -0.4479***  -0.0022*** -0.0022*** -0.0020***  -0.0030 -0.0030 0.0022 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.007) (0.001) (0.006)  (0.238) (0.282) (0.680) 
  For notes, see Table 4E. 
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Table 4E. GMM estimation results – Weighted genetic distance to the USA 
FD variable FI PCB IRS 
Break (percentile) Ø break 30th 50th 70th Ø break 30th 50th 70th Ø break 30th 50th 70th 
ln(y)(-1) 0.9209*** 0.9208*** 0.9188*** 0.9303*** 0.8965*** 0.9003*** 0.9003*** 0.9213*** 0.8627*** 0.8491*** 0.8591*** 0.8472*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(TER) 0.0243 0.0461* 0.0246 0.0112 0.0126 0.0262 0.0154 0.0060 -0.0011 0.0239 0.0039 0.0001 
 (0.328) (0.064) (0.334) (0.631) (0.597) (0.214) (0.491) (0.781) (0.959) (0.400) (0.863) (0.996) 
ln(GFCF) 0.1049** 0.0888** 0.1117** 0.1001** 0.1011** 0.0808** 0.1061** 0.0932** 0.0763 0.0643 0.0784 0.1155*** 
 (0.022) (0.045) (0.011) (0.020) (0.034) (0.042) (0.015) (0.038) (0.167) (0.258) (0.105) (0.009) 
Inflation -0.0007** -0.0007** -0.0007** -0.0007** -0.0007** -0.0007** -0.0007** -0.0007** -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0007 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.025) (0.024) (0.021) (0.271) (0.322) (0.240) (0.165) 
NR_rents 0.0035** 0.0044** 0.0042*** 0.0037** 0.0035** 0.0038** 0.0040** 0.0036** 0.0045*** 0.0056*** 0.0049*** 0.0042*** 
 (0.036) (0.011) (0.007) (0.023) (0.031) (0.019) (0.014) (0.032) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) 
GlobalCrisis -0.0531*** -0.0512*** -0.0515*** -0.0543*** -0.0476*** -0.0438*** -0.0428*** -0.0445*** -0.0667*** -0.0666*** -0.0667*** -0.0568*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
WGI 0.0680* 0.0888** 0.0852*** 0.0598* 0.0617* 0.0697** 0.0759** 0.0519 0.0599 0.0716** 0.0626* 0.0653* 
 (0.068) (0.013) (0.005) (0.093) (0.085) (0.037) (0.016) (0.145) (0.149) (0.045) (0.077) (0.096) 
FD -0.2357*** -0.4573*** -0.3591*** -0.2683*** -0.0009 -0.0023*** -0.0024*** -0.0021*** -0.0037* -0.0060** -0.0050*** 0.0004 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.166) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.095) (0.011) (0.002) (0.889) 
GDw -0.0001 -0.0002** -0.0002*** -0.0002* -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002** -0.0002* -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.201) (0.028) (0.009) (0.080) (0.262) (0.108) (0.026) (0.052) (0.335) (0.109) (0.222) (0.523) 
FD*GDw(30)  0.1618**    0.0012*    0.0042   
  (0.034)    (0.053)    (0.201)   
FD*GDw(50)   0.1865***    0.0019***    0.0025  
   (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.444)  
FD*GDw(70)    0.1900*    0.0019**    -0.0078** 
    (0.081)    (0.013)    (0.030) 
Sargan test (pv) 0.564 0.906 0.910 0.829 0.485 0.798 0.897 0.883 0.014 0.009 0.016 0.880 
Hansen test (pv) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) (pv) 0.115 0.131 0.127 0.112 0.107 0.114 0.122 0.115 0.082 0.074 0.074 0.107 
AR(2) (pv) 0.294 0.252 0.297 0.311 0.316 0.252 0.305 0.316 0.510 0.417 0.474 0.622 
n(instruments) 74 84 84 84 74 84 84 84 74 84 84 84 
n 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 156 156 156 156 
FD_upper  -0.2955*** -0.1726 -0.0783  -0.0011* -0.0005 -0.0002  -0.0018 -0.0025 -0.0074*** 
  (0.007) (0.201) (0.557)  (0.088) (0.574) (0.864)  (0.568) (0.448) (0.001) 
Notes to tables 4A-E: 1-step system GMM estimation of equation (1) with a maximum lag order of GMM level instruments set to 2. The 
constant term is not presented. Legal origin and imperial legacy dummies are used as standard instruments. Asterisks denote the 
significance level (*: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%). P-values of the t-tests are in parenthesis and are calculated according to standard errors which 
are robust to heteroskedasticity across and the arbitrary pattern of autocorrelation within countries. In the model statistics, only the p-values 
(pv) are presented. The number of complete observations in untransformed data and the number of instruments are denoted by n and 
n(instruments), respectively. FD_upper refers to the marginal effect of financial development on output in the upper ( )100 30 / 50 / 70−  
percent of the sample distribution of the respective DRD variable. It is the sum of the coefficients of FD and FD*DRD(#): 
1 3
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We summarize our findings as follows: 
1. Large ethnolinguistic fractionalization is advantageous to the growth effect of financial 
development at intermediate and lower levels of aggregation.  
2. Long state history is disadvantageous to the growth effect of financial development. 
3. Large genetic distance to the USA is positive for the growth effect of the banking sector.  
4. The breaks in the growth-finance relationship along these DRD threshold variables seem to be more 
pervasive in the case of size-based (private credit) and composite (FI) measures than in the case of 
the efficiency measure (interest rate spread) of financial development. 
 
Our findings run counter to conventional wisdom. First, the results of the economic development 
literature on the main effect of state history, fractionalization and genetic distance would predict 
exactly the opposite effect of these deep-rooted development variables on the growth-finance nexus. 
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In contrast with findings (1) to (3), we would expect smaller fractionalization, smaller genetic 
distance and longer state history to enhance the positive effect of finance on growth. The second 
puzzle relates to the findings on the effect of financial development.  As we have already noted, the 
baseline linear models reflect the already established results in the literature according to which the 
interest rate spread affects output negatively, whereas private credit tends to be irrelevant in transition 
countries.24 However, it is striking that even when nonlinear finance is taken into account, the best 
we can expect from private credit in transition countries is not to hinder long-run economic growth. 
Nonetheless, we note that our findings on transition economies are in line with those in Gillman and 
Harris (2004) and Coricelli and Masten (2004) in the sense that the main effect and the conditional 
indirect effect of size-based financial development measures were found to be negative and positive, 
respectively, in their papers too. 
 
Robustness Checks  
This section investigates the robustness of our results. In advance, the main conclusion of the section is 
that the results are robust to all sensitivity checks. The results on ethnolinguistic diversity are consistent 
for the different aggregation levels in the sense that level one retains its insignificance while levels three 
and six retain their significance with respect to the growth-finance relationship. We therefore 
concentrate only on the finest cleavages and omit the results of the DRD=ELF1 and DRD=ELF3 
specifications in order to save space.  Moreover, for each regression only those coefficients which stand 
at the centre of our interest in the given sensitivity scenario are depicted in the tables.25 The summary 
tables of the estimations are presented in the appendix. 
First, we check robustness with respect to the selected estimation method. Our default method can 
be criticized on three bases. First, GMM is a large sample technique where the beneficial asymptotic 
properties materialize only with panels with a large number of cross-sectional units. Our sample of 
26 transition countries naturally does not conform to this requirement. Second, 2-step GMM is usually 
preferred to 1-step GMM. Third, although the number of instruments is already constrained in the 
default estimations, it is still very high, amounting to three times that of the panel units. In other 
words, instrument proliferation is mitigated but, as the weak Hansen tests also indicate in tables 4A-
E, obviously not cancelled out by the maximization of the lag order of GMM level instruments. These 
concerns are legitimate, and we address them by estimating equation (1) using four alternative 
methods. First, we run pooled OLS estimations with panel-corrected robust standard errors 
                                                          
24 The results on FI cannot be judged in this way because of the lack of any counterpart in the literature owing to the short 
history of the index. Moreover, as we already noted, the significant negative growth effect of the FI index is not robust to 
the estimation methodology.  
25 For the details, consult the notes attached to the tables. The complete estimation results and the sensitivity analyses of 
the ELF1 and ELF3 specifications are provided upon request.  
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(henceforth PCSE) following Beck and Katz (1995). The criticisms related to the small size of our 
sample would be eased if the PCSE results were to convey the same conclusions on the presence and 
the nature of nonlinearity in the growth-finance nexus. Second, we run 1-step system GMM in 
accordance with two alternative approaches to instrument containment suggested in Roodman (2009b). 
The first method collapses the instrument matrix, meaning all the available lags of GMM level 
instruments are retained but they are constrained to having the same coefficients in each period when 
projecting the regressors onto them. The second method merges the previous two approaches of 
instrument containment by collapsing the instruments and, at the same time, maximizing the lag order 
of GMM level instruments at 2.26 As a final check of robustness to the estimation methodology, we 
run 2-step GMM estimations with the most parsimonious set of GMM instruments (collapsed 
instrument matrix and lag order of GMM level instruments maximized at 2).  
Table A1 presents the results in a block-wise structure and each FD-DRD-DRD(#) specification is 
framed by a dashed line. Each block consists of five estimations, one default and four alternative. The 
alternative estimations overwhelmingly support the default results.27 Clearly, there is no evidence 
that any of the four alternative estimations could systematically undermine the significance of 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization, state history and genetic distance as threshold variables. Moreover, 
the main effects of ancestry and diversity as well as of the financial development variables are also 
mostly consistent across different estimations with respect to their sign and significance. The only 
exception is the FI index, which generally preserves its negative coefficient, but loses significance in 
the alternative estimations. A further interesting by-result is that the Hansen tests continue to result 
in considerably large p-values even when the weakness of the tests is already less of a concern 
(‘maxL&cl’ estimations). This observation corroborates the validity of our instruments in the other 
estimations too. We conclude that our major findings are not driven by the chosen estimation 
methodology, and so in this sense they are certainly not biased.28    
The second robustness check focuses on contemporary threshold effects related to the stage of 
economic development, the quality of institutions and the size of the financial sector, which are 
                                                          
26 Beyond the moment conditions related to the standard instruments (legal origin, imperial affiliation) and the strictly 
exogenous regressors, we exploit the following moment conditions in the case of collapsing the instrument matrix: 
( ) | 0  2i t l itE x l lε− ∆ = ∀ ≥   and ( 1) 0i t itE x ε− ∆ =   where t 3≥ . Recall that x  is the vector of the right-hand-side variables in 
equation (1) with the exception of ‘GlobalCrisis’, ‘DRD’ and ‘NR_rents’. When the lag order of the collapsed GMM 
instruments is also constrained, the moment conditions related to the transformed (first-differenced) equation changes to 
( 2) 0i t itE x ε− ∆ =  , while the moment conditions related to the level equation remain unchanged.  
27 Out of the 27 FD-DRD-DRD(#) specifications depicted in the table, in ten instances the alternative estimations 
unanimously deliver consistent results with respect to the presence/absence of structural breaks in the growth-finance nexus. 
In another ten instances, there is always only one outlier which upsets the full consistency of the results on structural 
breaks.  
28 All the following robustness checks were also performed using a 1-step system GMM based on the most parsimonious 
instrument set (collapsed instruments and lag order of GMM level instruments maximized at 2). Neither of the conclusions 
were affected. The estimations are available upon request. 
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traditionally the focus of the nonlinear growth-finance literature. We augment our basic regression with 
suitable interaction terms to control for these channels. In the case of the institutional quality channel, 
the FD*WGI interaction is included in the model. The FD*ln(y)(-1) interaction controls for the 
development channel. Finally, we augment the model with the quadratic effect of the underlying 
financial development measure to take into account the financial channel. Table A2 presents the results 
in the usual block-wise structure. We only present the results on private credit and the FI index when 
the sample is split at the median (# = 50) of the deep-rooted development variable. The most important 
observation is that the FD*DRD(50) terms are hardly affected by the inclusion of contemporary 
thresholds. They preserve their sign, magnitude and significance robustly. These results confirm that 
breaks in the growth-finance relationship observed in our basic estimations are caused by deep roots 
of economic development and are not driven by omitted contemporary threshold effects.29  
The third robustness check disentangles the genuine deep root of nonlinear growth-finance in 
transition countries. The reasoning behind it is provided by the observation that ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization, state history and genetic distance are highly correlated with each other. Therefore, 
it might well be the case that only one or two of them represent really important threshold effects. In 
order to unravel this issue, we introduce the omitted deep-rooted development variables and the 
related FD*DRD(50) interaction terms into the regressions one-by-one. The results are presented in 
table A3. The block-wise style is retained, each block representing an FD-DRD-DRD(#) 
specification. The individual blocks encompass three models: one default and two augmented 
models.30  
The results in table A3 fully confirm our a priori intuition that ethnolinguistic fractionalization, 
state history and genetic distance are important separate sources of nonlinear finance in transition 
countries. For each deep-rooted development variable, at least in one of the related FD-DRD-DRD(#) 
specifications, the FD*DRD(#) interaction retains its sign, magnitude and significance consistently 
after controlling individually for the effects of the two other deep-rooted development variables. None 
of the three DRD variables is systematically disqualified by its counterparts as a relevant threshold 
                                                          
29 There are other interesting side-results in table A2. First, the introduced interactions are mostly insignificant which 
suggest that the usual contemporary threshold effects can be less important in transition finance. Second, the sign of the 
estimated interaction coefficients is more or less in line with the predictions of the general growth-finance literature. The 
negative quadratic FD term suggests that a saturation effect at financial sector size might be at work in transition countries 
as well (Law and Singh, 2014; Arcand et al., 2015). The negative coefficient of the FD*ln(y)(-1) interaction provides 
some corroboration with the notion that financial development is more beneficial in less developed (transition) countries 
(see, e.g., Huang and Lin, 2009). As regards the institutional channel, the negative FD*WGI coefficient predicts that 
better institutions erode the effect of finance on growth, which is hard to interpret and reconcile with previous results. 
Regarding the strong positive correlation between output and institutional quality, a possible explanation is that this 
interaction only takes the effect of the development channel. 
30 In order to save space, the results on the interest rate spread and the split at the 70th percentile of the DRD threshold 
variables are omitted. Note that the augmented model specification entails two breaks in the growth-finance relationship: 
one always at the 50th percentile of the additional DRD variable, and one at the #th percentile of the main DRD variable. 
The latter represents the threshold effect being in focus and moved according to the setting of the threshold value (#), 
while the former represents the steadily controlled-for threshold effect.   
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variable in the growth-finance relationship. Furthermore, the major findings of our baseline 
estimations are also unaffected by the compounding of the deep-rooted threshold effects: state history 
continues to be significantly negative, whereas fractionalization and genetic distance continue to be 
significantly positive with respect to the effect of financial development.  
The fourth robustness check investigates robustness with respect to the sample. We rerun the 
estimations on six constrained subsamples which omit the major regions of the post-socialist bloc – 
i.e., Central Asia, the Caucasus, Eastern Europe, the Baltic, Central Europe and South-Eastern Europe 
– one at a time. Here we discuss only the results on private credit.31 Table A4 presents the estimated 
PCB*DRD(#) coefficients from the underlying regressions.32 We find no evidence that the threshold 
effect of any of the three deep-rooted development variables would hinge upon the inclusion of a 
small number of countries into the sample. Of course, the estimated interaction coefficients vary 
across the subsamples but they always retain sign and, on most occasions, significance as well. 
Last but not least, we consider the robustness to the dependent variable, the covariates and the data 
frequency.  As regards the dependent variable, estimations are run on two alternative measures of 
scaled economic output: GDP per capita (‘rgdpna’/‘population’) and GDP per worker based on the 
‘rgdpo’ output series of PWT 9.0.33 The results are similar to the baseline results and deliver the same 
conclusions. With regard to the conditioning set of equation (1), we augment the model with several 
other conventional regressors such as government consumption, foreign direct investment, foreign 
trade, banking crisis dummy and EU membership dummy, one-by-one. All of them prove to be 
consistently and overwhelmingly insignificant and do not change our results. Moreover, we also 
control for time-fixed effects with similar outcomes: the included period dummies are mostly 
insignificant, leaving the previously explored nonlinearities unaffected. To check the sensitivity of 
our results to data frequency, we rerun the estimations on the annual sample of 1993 and 2014. The 
major results with regard to the breaks in the growth-finance nexus are unchanged.34  
  
                                                          
31 The results on FD=FI and FD=IRS lead us to similar conclusions. They are available in the online appendix. 
32 At an DRD variable we could expect one country-group to drive our results only in the case when the interaction term 
turns out to be irrelevant for each cut off point after dropping the respective countries from the sample. Concerning the 
three major cut off points, the latter occurs only in the case of state history when Central Asian countries are omitted. 
Therefore we investigated this instance closer and found a significant break when the sample was split at the 40th percentile 
of state history. 
33 Similarly to the ‘rgdpna’ series, ‘rgdpo’ is also a measure of real GDP in PPP and 2011 prices in the PWT9.0 database. 
The two series coincide in 2011, but differ in the other years due to their different approach in the derivation of constant 
price, purchasing power parity data. The ‘rgdpna’ operates with the constant price GDP growth rates in the national-
accounts, while ‘rgdpo’ is calculated according to chained PPP series. For further discussion, see Feenstra et al. (2015). 





The main results and robustness checks presented above underscore the transformative effect of 
diversity on the nonlinear finance-growth nexus and present novel implications for the relevance of 
diversity for financial development. First, ethnolinguistic fractionalization appears to produce 
insignificant results at the highest level of aggregation (ELF1). Deeper cleavages in society cannot 
be compensated by financial development nor do they alter the effect of finance on growth.  However, 
at intermediate and lower levels of aggregation (ELF3 and ELF6), ethnolinguistic fractionalization 
enhances the growth impact of financial development in a favorable way by eliminating the 
potentially detrimental effect of credit on growth while preserving (or even slightly improving) the 
beneficial effect of an interest rate spread decrease. This occurs most frequently at the 30th and 50th 
percentiles of their respective distributions. We argue that in ethnolinguistically diverse societies 
financial development resolves economic coordination failures and liquidity constraints emanating 
from the lack of trust. Moreover, it facilitates the unfolding of skill complementarities. One possible 
channel for the latter is a relatively developed banking sector, which makes up for other external 
funding sources, such as venture capital or trade credits, which are likely to be underdeveloped in a 
low-trust environment. Moreover, it can contribute to the improvement of social capital in fragmented 
societies by providing external liquidity to minority entrepreneurs. The underlying condition here is 
that finer rather than deeper ethnolinguistic fractionalization would increase the opportunity cost of 
civil or social conflict. When initial cultural divisions are extremely high, financial development 
cannot reduce the propensity for conflict and hence reverse the negative effect of polarization on 
economic growth. On the contrary, when cultural distances exist at moderate or low levels, then 
diversity bolsters the finance-growth nexus. This is particularly crucial for those ethnolinguistic 
groups with limited access to political office and lobbying.  
Ager and Brueckner (2013) provide evidence that cultural fractionalization due to massive 
European migration to the United States at the turn of the previous century has had a positive effect 
on U.S. economic growth, whereas cultural polarization has produced an economically and 
statistically significant negative effect on growth. With evidence from US counties, they reinforce 
the notion that diversity can be a blessing at the subnational (micro) level, provided that the 
institutions are developed enough to cope with social conflict and lack of trust. Gerring et al. (2015) 
find that ethnolinguistic (and religious) fractionalization positively affects human development (i.e., 
education, wealth etc.) at subnational levels in developing countries. They propose that the 
establishment of formal problem-solving institutions is costlier at national rather than at subnational 
levels and that informal institutions are more likely to compensate ad hoc for coordination 
inefficiencies at the subnational level.  
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Our results are in line with those of Agner and Brueckner (2013), Gerring et al. (2015), Desmet et 
al. (2012) and the general fractionalization literature. First, the negative coefficients of ELF1, ELF3, 
and ELF6 convey the detrimental effect of fractionalization at the national level (e.g. Alesina et al., 
2003). Second, the insignificance of the highest aggregation level, both with regard to its main effect 
and its interaction with financial development, matches the findings of Desmet et al. (2012), who 
stress the relatively larger importance of finer linguistic cleavages for economic growth. Third, the 
positive effect of fractionalization on the growth-finance nexus confirms the aforementioned findings 
on the effect of diversity at subnational levels. Financial development can serve as a major instrument 
to mitigate social conflict and pitfalls related to the lack of trust as well as to facilitate the emergence 
of skill complementarities. 
State history as a proxy for the exposure to institutions, centralization and political organization 
induces a negative effect of financial development on growth because it eases the provision of credit 
under conditions of adverse selection and moral hazard. Moreover, long state history can lead to the 
formation of deeply entrenched interest groups and therefore to extractive institutions. Indeed, this is 
the argument of Borcan et al. (2014) underlying the proposed inverted U-shaped relationship between 
state history and economic development. Our results suggest that in transition economies long state 
history reinforces the negative impact of finance on growth. As Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) 
indicate, credit decentralization resolves the commitment problem of the creditor and allows him not 
to refinance an unprofitable project. In contrast, when the provision of credit is centralized by the 
state or occurs under conditions of bank concentration and low market competition, refinancing of an 
unprofitable project occurs in the form of soft budget constraints (ibid.).  
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013) identify a strong positive effect of ancestral institutions on growth. 
Nevertheless, they do not consider any intermediate mechanisms that could condition the long-run 
impact of institutions on growth, also from the perspective of centralized governance and state 
intervention in private sector development. As Ang (2015) indicates, state antiquity in itself remains 
a black box if one does not resort to more detailed analytical grounding including the role of military 
technology, financial instruments, geographic proximity to the frontier and government capacity. In 
a previous paper, Ang (2013) establishes the link between state antiquity and the level of financial 
development. Our results help to further open the black box of state history. They offer a channel, the 
growth-finance nexus, which mediates the negative effects of an excessively long state history.  
In this paper, we suggest that countries with a longer state tradition are less likely to grow through 
their financial sector. This is particularly the case from the limited yet indicative nature of our sample. 
What we observe in East-Central Europe and the former Soviet Union is a relatively developed 
financial sector that may be frequently captured by politicians and interest groups. On the one hand, 
incumbent politicians can buy off the support of private interest groups through the provision of soft 
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budget constraints. On the other hand, powerful interest groups can raise entry barriers and that way 
restrict access to finance for small and medium-sized entrepreneurs. In transition economies, political 
rent-seeking, long-run survival of governments and the preservation of corporate oligarchies have 
been crucial aspects of the political-economic process and inherently linked with financial 
development. Hence, ancestral statehood facilitates the provision of soft budget constraints as a result 
of business-government bargains, which also bolster bank concentration. Becerra et al. (2012) 
identify a tradeoff between state capacity and the influence of incumbent interest groups toward 
financial development. What we suggest is that the long-term survival of governments in the post-
socialist region is likely to rely on bailouts of interest groups through the financial sector.  
The ex-ante presence of dominant interest groups as a result of state history renders financial 
development a costly, yet stable, equilibrium both for the interest groups and for incumbent 
politicians. A more sophisticated financial system raises the threshold of financial cooptation for 
incumbent politicians, with the result that they avoid competition by politicians promising a higher 
bid to interest groups. At the same time, financial development renders it costlier for ruling business 
actors to prevent the market entry of new competitors, thus encouraging the deeper entrenchment of 
them. Hence, in transition economies financial development as an equilibrium conditioned by state 
history can undermine growth. Highly developed financial institutions make the cooptation of interest 
groups costlier for incumbent politicians and reduce the probability of new competitive entries due 
to the furthering of interest group dominance.  
Within transition economies, the successor states of the Russian Empire show intermediate to low 
levels of state history, whereas the opposite holds for many of the successor states of the Austro-
Hungarian and the Ottoman Empires (intermediate to high levels of state history).35 Our results show 
that financial development and credit provision inhibited rather than advanced growth in transition 
economies with a high ancestral institutional legacy. We propose that the competition of entrenched 
interest groups for easy credit contributed crucially to this unfavorable outcome. However, the 
evolution of the banking sector in post-socialist countries could also provide further impetus for the 
provision of soft-budget constraints from the credit supply side. The transformation of socialist 
financial systems in the 1990s allowed bank consolidation, which in turn facilitated bank 
concentration and the proliferation of foreign banks (Bonin et al., 2015). Foreign banks, which are 
particularly dominant in East-Central Europe, have been much more inclined to lend to households 
and large companies, rather than small and medium-size enterprises (ibid.). Moreover, bank 
concentration is likely to lead to inefficient bargains between banks and large enterprises, as well as 
between government and the overall private sector. Hence, ancestral statehood facilitates the 
                                                          
35 See table 2 and figure 1. For a more detailed analysis, see Ang (2015); Putterman (2004). 
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provision of soft budget constraints in transition economies under the mutually enforcing pressure of 
interest group competition and bank concentration. 
To sum up, while we confirm the positive direct effect of state history on growth, we also 
underscore its negative effect on financial development as a growth determinant per se. Institutions 
matter for growth, but not always in a positive way. The ambiguous role of finance in the economic 
transformation of East-Central Europe and the former Soviet Union can therefore to some extent be 
attributed to the divergent state history paths of historical Europe and Eurasia.  
Genetic distance of transition economies to the world technology frontier, the US economy, 
strengthens the positive impact of banking sector development on growth. The reliance of East-
Central Europe and the former Soviet Union on continental-style rather than Anglo-Saxon-style 
financial systems can be considered to some extent a consequence of closer genetic relatedness to 
Western European continental countries than to Anglo-Saxon ones. Namely, the adherence to bank-
based rather than market-based financial systems occurs due to reduced adoption and imitation costs. 
The diffusion of financial norms becomes less costly for nations that share lower rather than higher 
genetic distances to each other. It is essential to add here that a significant negative correlation of 
approximately 18 percent is observable between genetic distance to the US population and stock 
market capitalization in our sample of transition economies. Our data shows that the more eastern the 
location of a country within the post-socialist bloc, the weaker the genealogical relatedness to the 
United States and the less developed capital markets are on average (tables 2 and 3). Less developed 
capital markets imply a higher reliance on traditional financial institutions, such as banks, to channel 
household savings to enterprises. This may explain the positive effect of genetic distance on the 
growth-finance relationship in transition economies. We suggest that the higher genetic relatedness 
of East-Central Europe and the former Soviet Union to Germany and France rather than the United 
States renders the selection of banks as the liquidity backbone of the economy an efficient long-run 
institutional choice.  
 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have identified the significance of ancestral institutions, ethnolinguistic diversity 
and genetic distance to the United States for the impact of finance on growth in transition economies. 
We are convinced that our results are important for two reasons. First, they enrich the growth-finance 
literature in transition economies by offering a long-run theory of diversity and institutions. The 
development of the banking sector can be conducive to growth when it is conditioned by human 
genetic distance to the United States and thus proximity to the Western European continent. At the 
same time, a solid tradition of ancient statehood can be detrimental to the effect of finance on growth, 
contrary to what one would expect from conventional wisdom. While our results do not defy the main 
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literature finding on the positive growth effect of state history, they also propose an important 
downside on the role of institutions for economic performance. When exposed to a long history of 
political organization and centralization that give rise to extractive institutions, the financial channel 
becomes a non-optimal path for economic transformation due to the potential provision of soft budget 
constraints. Furthermore, finer, rather than deeper, ethnolinguistic cleavages positively reinforce the 
finance-growth nexus through credit creation toward small and medium-size enterprises, also for 
minorities, and by setting larger emphasis on the role of financial development in resolving economic 
coordination failures and liquidity constraints related to fractionalization. 
The second major contribution of this paper is a new theory of economic transitions in post-
socialist Europe and Eurasia. Finer cultural differences explain the successful economic 
transformation in East-Central Europe and the relative economic backwardness observed in 
Southeastern Europe and the former Soviet Union throughout the transition period, but also 
afterwards. Nevertheless, the negative effect of state history on the growth-finance nexus shows why 
soft budget constraints persist today, even in the EU parts of the post-communist region. Further 
research is needed to explain the role of ancestry and diversity in the finance-growth nexus, both in 
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Table A1. Sensitivity to the estimation method 
  FD variable FI PCB IRS 





























FD -0.2817*** -0.2242 -0.2549 -0.0608 -0.0916 -0.0019*** -0.0018** -0.0019** -0.0013 -0.0014*** 0.0034 0.0046 0.0093 0.0093 -0.0019 
 (0.003) (0.134) (0.130) (0.751) (0.270) (0.003) (0.027) (0.015) (0.134) (0.008) (0.420) (0.292) (0.276) (0.212) (0.239) 
ELF6 -0.2813* -0.3426* -0.3214* -0.3149* -0.2650*** -0.2771* -0.2576* -0.2308 -0.2016 -0.2942*** 0.0425 0.0710 0.1074 0.0968 -0.0672 
 (0.074) (0.055) (0.064) (0.095) (0.000) (0.067) (0.092) (0.143) (0.301) (0.000) (0.687) (0.524) (0.484) (0.479) (0.244) 
FD*ELF6(30) 0.2043** 0.2904** 0.2867** 0.2683** 0.2083*** 0.0023** 0.0021** 0.0020** 0.0016 0.0026*** -0.0084** -0.0091** -0.0104* -0.0113* -0.0025* 
 (0.042) (0.019) (0.013) (0.030) (0.000) (0.012) (0.020) (0.033) (0.108) (0.000) (0.021) (0.017) (0.089) (0.056) (0.097) 
n(instruments) 84 54 24 24  84 54 24 24  84 54 24 24  
Hansen-test (pv) 1.000 0.998 0.168 0.168  1.000 0.998 0.201 0.201  1.000 1.000 0.141 0.141  
FD -0.2541*** -0.0365 -0.0827 -0.0412 -0.0563 -0.0020*** -0.0016* -0.0019** -0.0015 -0.0013** -0.0058*** -0.0088*** -0.0067** -0.0054 -0.0037*** 
 (0.004) (0.809) (0.593) (0.855) (0.515) (0.002) (0.051) (0.024) (0.143) (0.046) (0.009) (0.000) (0.029) (0.339) (0.000) 
ELF6 -0.3606** -0.4311** -0.3967** -0.4072 -0.3065*** -0.2805* -0.2697* -0.2484 -0.1950 -0.2828*** -0.1080 -0.1247 -0.1660 -0.0918 -0.0662 
 (0.024) (0.017) (0.022) (0.171) (0.000) (0.054) (0.069) (0.110) (0.392) (0.001) (0.295) (0.288) (0.191) (0.736) (0.251) 
FD*ELF(50) 0.2797** 0.3715** 0.3394** 0.3246 0.2424*** 0.0022** 0.0020** 0.0020** 0.0015 0.0023*** -0.0004 0.0010 0.0028 0.0014 -0.0023 
 (0.025) (0.017) (0.019) (0.163) (0.003) (0.016) (0.033) (0.039) (0.259) (0.002) (0.852) (0.671) (0.256) (0.788) (0.111) 
n(instruments) 84 54 24 24  84 54 24 24  84 54 24 24  
Hansen-test (pv) 1.000 1.000 0.088 0.088  1.000 1.000 0.078 0.078  1.000 0.999 0.067 0.067  
FD -0.2036** -0.0760 -0.1529 -0.0868 -0.0114 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0012 -0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0017 -0.0057** -0.0018 0.0005 -0.0033*** 
 (0.023) (0.633) (0.345) (0.718) (0.899) (0.106) (0.259) (0.184) (0.397) (0.581) (0.567) (0.019) (0.681) (0.923) (0.000) 
ELF6 -0.1843 -0.1950 -0.1743 -0.1072 -0.1669** -0.1661 -0.1619 -0.1499 -0.1005 -0.1688** -0.0097 -0.0871 -0.0489 -0.0284 -0.0266 
 (0.159) (0.165) (0.219) (0.556) (0.032) (0.191) (0.198) (0.239) (0.590) (0.026) (0.919) (0.419) (0.666) (0.880) (0.621) 
FD*ELF6(70) 0.0779 0.1161 0.1023 0.0365 0.0885 0.0009 0.0009 0.0011 0.0006 0.0011* -0.0049* -0.0012 -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0044*** 
 (0.433) (0.309) (0.328) (0.820) (0.197) (0.232) (0.237) (0.127) (0.598) (0.091) (0.069) (0.607) (0.448) (0.581) (0.002) 
n(instruments) 84 54 24 24  84 54 24 24  84 54 24 24  
Hansen-test (pv) 1.000 0.999 0.071 0.071  1.000 1.000 0.142 0.142  1.000 1.000 0.139 0.139  
FD -0.2694** -0.0753 -0.1750 -0.0448 0.0405 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0004 -0.0067** -0.0087*** -0.0045 -0.0059 -0.0085*** 
 (0.039) (0.723) (0.411) (0.904) (0.742) (0.472) (0.946) (0.819) (0.990) (0.602) (0.011) (0.001) (0.266) (0.367) (0.000) 
SHadj 0.6171** 0.6793** 0.6300** 0.6535 0.5372*** 0.4897* 0.5278* 0.5172* 0.5271 0.4922*** 0.1100 0.2167 0.2660 0.1686 -0.0003 
 (0.031) (0.041) (0.049) (0.105) (0.000) (0.061) (0.061) (0.074) (0.224) (0.000) (0.532) (0.335) (0.282) (0.579) (0.997) 
FD*SHadj(30) -0.1494 -0.1788 -0.1625 -0.1974 -0.1596*** -0.0016* -0.0014 -0.0017 -0.0016 -0.0016*** 0.0037 0.0012 -0.0001 0.0009 0.0054*** 
 (0.153) (0.182) (0.199) (0.227) (0.007) (0.078) (0.138) (0.102) (0.246) (0.004) (0.137) (0.565) (0.977) (0.810) (0.002) 
n(instruments) 84 54 24 24  84 54 24 24  84 54 24 24  
Hansen-test (pv) 1.000 1.000 0.150 0.150  1.000 1.000 0.105 0.105  1.000 1.000 0.176 0.176  
FD -0.1805 -0.0263 -0.1173 0.0557 0.1272 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0004 0.0010 -0.0063** -0.0065** -0.0050 -0.0055 -0.0049*** 
 (0.218) (0.900) (0.594) (0.858) (0.245) (0.861) (0.757) (0.914) (0.738) (0.177) (0.016) (0.017) (0.204) (0.338) (0.000) 
SHadj 0.8333** 0.9465*** 0.8594** 0.9415** 0.8018*** 0.6041* 0.6770** 0.6481** 0.6521 0.6876*** 0.0503 0.2865 0.1137 0.0239 0.1083 
 (0.018) (0.008) (0.012) (0.044) (0.000) (0.051) (0.032) (0.037) (0.126) (0.000) (0.796) (0.260) (0.664) (0.956) (0.259) 
FD*SHadj(50) -0.2445** -0.3002** -0.2580** -0.3290* -0.2835*** -0.0020** -0.0022** -0.0023** -0.0022* -0.0026*** 0.0033 0.0002 0.0023 0.0027 0.0024 
 (0.041) (0.018) (0.030) (0.059) (0.000) (0.035) (0.021) (0.018) (0.060) (0.000) (0.159) (0.956) (0.517) (0.627) (0.101) 
n(instruments) 84 54 24 24  84 54 24 24  84 54 24 24  
Hansen-test (pv) 1.000 1.000 0.142 0.142  1.000 1.000 0.162 0.162  1.000 1.000 0.178 0.178  
FD -0.3417*** -0.2364 -0.3317** -0.2444 -0.0326 -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0055*** -0.0076*** -0.0047 -0.0044 -0.0042*** 
 (0.001) (0.144) (0.023) (0.289) (0.758) (0.159) (0.404) (0.258) (0.913) (0.637) (0.001) (0.000) (0.178) (0.245) (0.000) 
SHadj 0.5366** 0.6021** 0.6050** 0.5492 0.5054*** 0.3991 0.4610* 0.4612* 0.4285 0.4729*** 0.0602 0.1262 0.1044 0.0539 0.2393** 
 (0.046) (0.026) (0.023) (0.156) (0.001) (0.114) (0.077) (0.067) (0.246) (0.001) (0.781) (0.548) (0.680) (0.867) (0.017) 
FD*SHadj(70) -0.1062 -0.1305 -0.1542* -0.1480 -0.1548** -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0016* -0.0014 -0.0016** 0.0077 0.0070 0.0090 0.0081 0.0004 
 (0.218) (0.145) (0.092) (0.273) (0.037) (0.182) (0.229) (0.095) (0.236) (0.016) (0.131) (0.284) (0.317) (0.459) (0.865) 
n(instruments) 84 54 24 24  84 54 24 24  84 54 24 24  
Hansen-test (pv) 1.000 1.000 0.106 0.106  1.000 1.000 0.163 0.163  1.000 1.000 0.335 0.335  
FD -0.4573*** -0.3266* -0.3887 -0.2960 -0.1441 -0.0023*** -0.0018 -0.0023 -0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0060** -0.0091** -0.0069* -0.0031 -0.0052*** 
 (0.003) (0.081) (0.118) (0.633) (0.437) (0.001) (0.114) (0.115) (0.209) (0.409) (0.011) (0.017) (0.087) (0.507) (0.000) 
GDw -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002 -0.0001* -0.0001 -0.0001* -0.0001* -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002* -0.0002* -0.0002 -0.0001** 
 (0.028) (0.021) (0.026) (0.460) (0.071) (0.108) (0.075) (0.054) (0.103) (0.112) (0.109) (0.057) (0.064) (0.174) (0.012) 
FD*GDw(30) 0.1618** 0.1540* 0.1738* 0.1058 0.1167 0.0012* 0.0011 0.0015* 0.0010 0.0009 0.0042 0.0077* 0.0081** 0.0052 0.0033*** 
 (0.034) (0.073) (0.082) (0.758) (0.250) (0.053) (0.155) (0.080) (0.133) (0.416) (0.201) (0.057) (0.049) (0.173) (0.001) 
n(instruments) 84 54 24 24  84 54 24 24  84 54 24 24  
Hansen-test (pv) 1.000 1.000 0.154 0.154  1.000 1.000 0.191 0.191  1.000 1.000 0.389 0.389  
FD -0.3591*** -0.1737 -0.2186 -0.1024 -0.0701 -0.0024*** -0.0020* -0.0021* -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0050*** -0.0065*** -0.0047 -0.0030 -0.0044*** 
 (0.006) (0.319) (0.265) (0.714) (0.524) (0.001) (0.055) (0.088) (0.531) (0.139) (0.002) (0.009) (0.118) (0.363) (0.000) 
GDw -0.0002*** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0003* -0.0001*** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002* -0.0001*** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.00002 
 (0.009) (0.021) (0.022) (0.073) (0.000) (0.026) (0.025) (0.022) (0.084) (0.000) (0.222) (0.247) (0.225) (0.837) (0.244) 
FD*GDw(50) 0.1865*** 0.1844* 0.1937** 0.1770 0.1371*** 0.0019*** 0.0018** 0.0020** 0.0015 0.0014*** 0.0025 0.0021 0.0030 0.0000 0.0005 
 (0.005) (0.053) (0.042) (0.184) (0.000) (0.005) (0.028) (0.014) (0.303) (0.001) (0.444) (0.567) (0.429) (0.992) (0.571) 
n(instruments) 84 54 24 24  84 54 24 24  84 54 24 24  
Hansen-test (pv) 1.000 1.000 0.224 0.224  1.000 1.000 0.192 0.192  1.000 1.000 0.457 0.457  
FD -0.2683*** -0.1181 -0.1521 -0.0474 -0.0203 -0.0021*** -0.0017* -0.0016 -0.0008 -0.0010 0.0004 -0.0026 -0.0005 -0.0021 -0.0034*** 
 (0.002) (0.398) (0.330) (0.851) (0.842) (0.002) (0.094) (0.119) (0.641) (0.242) (0.889) (0.331) (0.922) (0.739) (0.000) 
GDw -0.0002* -0.0002* -0.0002* -0.0003 -0.0001*** -0.0002* -0.0002* -0.0002* -0.0002 -0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001* 
 (0.080) (0.083) (0.079) (0.155) (0.000) (0.052) (0.054) (0.059) (0.148) (0.001) (0.523) (0.473) (0.488) (0.555) (0.078) 
FD*GDw(70) 0.1900* 0.2146* 0.2375* 0.2563 0.1203*** 0.0019** 0.0018** 0.0019** 0.0017 0.0013** -0.0078** -0.0090* -0.0091** -0.0078** -0.0038*** 
 (0.081) (0.095) (0.075) (0.144) (0.002) (0.013) (0.028) (0.016) (0.129) (0.011) (0.030) (0.068) (0.036) (0.015) (0.009) 
n(instruments) 84 54 24 24  84 54 24 24  84 54 24 24  
Hansen-test (pv) 1.000 1.000 0.198 0.198  1.000 1.000 0.233 0.233  1.000 1.000 0.443 0.443  
Notes: Estimation results on equation (1). “SGMM-1 maxL” – 1-step system GMM with GMM level instruments lag maximized at order 2 (default), “SGMM-1 cl” 
– 1-step system GMM with collapsed instruments (Roodman, 2009b), “SGMM-1 maxL&cl” – 1-step system GMM with collapsed instruments and with GMM level 
instruments lag maximized at order 2, “SGMM-2 maxL&cl” – 2-step system GMM with collapsed instruments and with GMM level instruments lag maximized at 
order 2, “PCSE” – OLS. At each GMM estimation, legal origin and imperial legacy dummies are used as standard instruments. The constant and the coefficients of 
the ‘conditioning set’ including the lagged dependent variable are omitted to save space. P-values of the t-tests calculated according to robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. Robust standard errors: 2-step GMM (robust s.e. of Windmeijer (2005)), PCSE (panel-corrected s.e. of Beck and Katz (1995)), 1-step GMM (see the 
notes of tables 4A-E.). Asterisks denote the significance level (*: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%). Structural breaks significant at standard levels are depicted in bold.   
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Table A2. Sensitivity to the inclusion of contemporary threshold effects 
































ln(y)(-1) 0.8790*** 0.8769*** 0.9360*** 0.8585*** 0.8793*** 0.8896*** 0.9180*** 0.8738*** 0.9188*** 0.9084*** 0.9687*** 0.8905*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
WGI 0.0552** 0.1116** 0.0602** 0.0549** 0.0910** 0.1075* 0.0814** 0.0928** 0.0852*** 0.1492*** 0.0900*** 0.0908*** 
 (0.042) (0.018) (0.017) (0.028) (0.011) (0.053) (0.017) (0.013) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
FI -0.2541*** -0.2431*** 2.3160 0.3668 -0.1805 -0.2254 1.0964 -0.1349 -0.3591*** -0.3521*** 1.8507 0.1819 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.111) (0.211) (0.218) (0.114) (0.531) (0.718) (0.006) (0.007) (0.236) (0.521) 
DRD -0.3606** -0.3460** -0.3591** -0.3258** 0.8333** 0.7895** 0.7008* 0.8346** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 
 (0.024) (0.028) (0.025) (0.037) (0.018) (0.035) (0.072) (0.039) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
FI*DRD(50) 0.2797** 0.2579** 0.2637** 0.2377** -0.2445** -0.2246* -0.1992 -0.2421* 0.1865*** 0.1891** 0.1622** 0.1903*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.032) (0.046) (0.041) (0.077) (0.137) (0.091) (0.005) (0.011) (0.017) (0.008) 
CTV  -0.1739 -0.2480* -0.7287**  -0.0601 -0.1218 -0.0596  -0.1689** -0.2121 -0.6288** 






ln(y)(-1) 0.8869*** 0.8860*** 0.9162*** 0.8694*** 0.8783*** 0.8851*** 0.9026*** 0.8727*** 0.9003*** 0.8952*** 0.9192*** 0.8976*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
WGI 0.0442* 0.0545 0.0473* 0.0496** 0.0669** 0.0634 0.0670** 0.0702** 0.0759** 0.0950** 0.0830*** 0.0753** 
 (0.082) (0.150) (0.054) (0.040) (0.047) (0.181) (0.036) (0.043) (0.016) (0.019) (0.009) (0.013) 
PCB -0.0020*** -0.0017** 0.0155 0.0009 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0119 0.0010 -0.0024*** -0.0023*** 0.0109 -0.0012 
 (0.002) (0.029) (0.272) (0.544) (0.861) (0.879) (0.443) (0.563) (0.001) (0.004) (0.403) (0.396) 
DRD -0.2805* -0.2730* -0.2744* -0.2702** 0.6041* 0.5885* 0.5570* 0.6216** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** 
 (0.054) (0.056) (0.057) (0.049) (0.051) (0.069) (0.090) (0.048) (0.026) (0.022) (0.031) (0.026) 
PCB*DRD(50) 0.0022** 0.0020** 0.0020** 0.0021** -0.0020** -0.0020** -0.0018* -0.0022** 0.0019*** 0.0021*** 0.0018*** 0.0020*** 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.026) (0.012) (0.035) (0.047) (0.085) (0.026) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) 
CTV  -0.0005 -0.0017 -0.00004**  -0.0001 -0.0012 -0.00001  -0.0006 -0.0013 -0.00002 
  (0.529) (0.219) (0.028)  (0.897) (0.442) (0.360)  (0.309) (0.309) (0.236) 
Notes: 1-step system GMM estimations of the following regression: [ ]1 2 3 4ln( ) ( (#) ) . Tit i it i it i it it ity FD DRD FD DRD cond set CTVα β β β γ β ε= + + + ⋅ + + + , 
where CTV is the interaction controlling for the respective contemporary threshold effect. The lag order of GMM level instruments is maximized at 
2. Legal origin and imperial legacy dummies are involved as standard instruments in each case. The constant and the coefficients of the ‘conditioning 
set’ – with the exception of WGI and ln(y)(-1) – are omitted to save space. P-values of the t-tests are in parenthesis and are calculated according to 
standard errors which are robust to heteroskedasticity across and arbitrary pattern of autocorrelation within countries. Asterisks denote the 
significance level (*: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%). Those cases where the FD*DRD(#) interaction term retains sign and significance consistently after 
controlling for the individual contemporary threshold effects are depicted in bold. 
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Table A3. Sensitivity to the inclusion of additional deep-rooted developmental variables 
DRD variable ELF6 SHadj GDw 
FD variable FI PCB FI PCB FI PCB 




GDw SHadj Ø 
(default) 
GDw SHadj Ø 
(default) 
GDw ELF6 Ø 
(default) 
GDw ELF6 Ø 
(default) 
SHadj ELF6 Ø 
(default) 
SHadj ELF6 
FD -0.2817*** -0.4059*** -0.2848* -0.0019*** -0.0032*** -0.0017* -0.2694** -0.3428** -0.2631 -0.0005 -0.0019* -0.0018 -0.4573*** -0.2384 -0.3899*** -0.0023*** -0.0012 -0.0031*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.068) (0.003) (0.000) (0.084) (0.039) (0.038) (0.108) (0.472) (0.056) (0.107) (0.003) (0.104) (0.007) (0.001) (0.122) (0.000) 
DRD -0.2813* -0.2948* -0.1588 -0.2771* -0.2682* -0.1957 0.6171** 0.3881 0.3606* 0.4897* 0.3086 0.2202 -0.0002** -0.0001** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001** -0.0001 
 (0.074) (0.054) (0.164) (0.067) (0.072) (0.109) (0.031) (0.175) (0.061) (0.061) (0.221) (0.293) (0.028) (0.015) (0.265) (0.108) (0.045) (0.303) 
FD*DRD(30) 0.2043** 0.2109** 0.1851** 0.0023** 0.0020** 0.0023*** -0.1494 -0.0697 -0.0687 -0.0016* -0.0008 -0.0002 0.1618** 0.1189** 0.1186 0.0012* 0.0011** 0.0011* 
 (0.042) (0.015) (0.027) (0.012) (0.019) (0.005) (0.153) (0.535) (0.586) (0.078) (0.388) (0.890) (0.034) (0.019) (0.110) (0.053) (0.018) (0.078) 
DRDadd  -0.0002** 0.7444***  -0.0001* 0.4052*  -0.0001* -0.2565*  -0.0001* -0.2028  0.7588** -0.3340**  0.5625* -0.2544* 
  (0.011) (0.009)  (0.062) (0.078)  (0.068) (0.060)  (0.090) (0.143)  (0.022) (0.046)  (0.067) (0.084) 
FD* DRDadd(50)  0.2114*** -0.1837  0.0019*** -0.0008  0.1327* 0.2285**  0.0016* 0.0020*  -0.2719** 0.2429*  -0.0024** 0.0021** 
  (0.002) (0.129)  (0.005) (0.366)  (0.080) (0.042)  (0.056) (0.083)  (0.023) (0.064)  (0.026) (0.035) 
FD -0.2541*** -0.3245*** -0.1840 -0.0020*** -0.0028*** -0.0012 -0.1805 -0.1904 -0.1840 -0.0001 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.3591*** -0.1904 -0.3245*** -0.0024*** -0.0012 -0.0028*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.217) (0.002) (0.001) (0.262) (0.218) (0.214) (0.217) (0.861) (0.261) (0.262) (0.006) (0.214) (0.009) (0.001) (0.261) (0.001) 
DRD -0.3606** -0.3119* -0.2580* -0.2805* -0.2362 -0.1918 0.8333** 0.6733* 0.6720** 0.6041* 0.4761 0.4091* -0.0002*** -0.0001* -0.0001 -0.0002** -0.0001* -0.0001 
 (0.024) (0.076) (0.051) (0.054) (0.133) (0.118) (0.018) (0.071) (0.014) (0.051) (0.135) (0.093) (0.009) (0.083) (0.157) (0.026) (0.086) (0.153) 
FD*DRD(50) 0.2797** 0.2012 0.2394** 0.0022** 0.0014 0.0017** -0.2445** -0.2152* -0.2135* -0.0020** -0.0017 -0.0013 0.1865*** 0.1019 0.1480** 0.0019*** 0.0013 0.0017** 
 (0.025) (0.121) (0.021) (0.016) (0.163) (0.023) (0.041) (0.097) (0.089) (0.035) (0.116) (0.184) (0.005) (0.231) (0.020) (0.005) (0.108) (0.029) 
DRDadd  -0.0001 0.6720**  -0.0001 0.4091*  -0.0001* -0.2580*  -0.0001* -0.1918  0.6733* -0.3119*  0.4761 -0.2362 
  (0.157) (0.014)  (0.153) (0.093)  (0.083) (0.051)  (0.086) (0.118)  (0.071) (0.076)  (0.135) (0.133) 
FD* DRDadd(50)  0.1480** -0.2135*  0.0017** -0.0013  0.1019 0.2394**  0.0013 0.0017**  -0.2152* 0.2012  -0.0017 0.0014 
  (0.020) (0.089)  (0.029) (0.184)  (0.231) (0.021)  (0.108) (0.023)  (0.097) (0.121)  (0.116) (0.163) 
Notes: 1-step system GMM estimations of the following regression: [ ]1 2 3 4 , 5ln( ) ( (#) ) . ( (50) )Tit i it i it i it add i it add i ity FD DRD FD DRD cond set DRD FD DRDα β β β γ β β ε= + + + ⋅ + + + ⋅ + , where DRDadd  is the additional 
deep-rooted development variable. The lag order of GMM level instruments is maximized at 2. Legal origin and imperial legacy dummies are involved as standard instruments in each case. The constant and 
the coefficients of the ‘conditioning set’ including the lagged dependent variable are omitted to save space. P-values of the t-tests are in parenthesis and are calculated according to standard errors which are 
robust to heteroskedasticity across and arbitrary pattern of autocorrelation within countries.  Asterisks denote the significance level (*: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%). Those cases where the FD*DRD(#) interaction 
terms retain sign and significance consistently after controlling for the other deep-rooted threshold effects are depicted in bold. 
 
Table A4. Sensitivity to the sample: Summary of the FD=PCB specifications 
DRD variable SHadj ELF6 GDw 
Sample full Smpl1 Smpl2 Smpl3 Smpl4 Smpl5 Smpl6 full Smpl1 Smpl2 Smpl3 Smpl4 Smpl5 Smpl6 full Smpl1 Smpl2 Smpl3 Smpl4 Smpl5 Smpl6 
PCB*DRD(30) -0.0016* -0.0017* -0.0010 -0.0023** -0.0018* -0.0019** -0.0015 0.0023** 0.0015** 0.0021** 0.0019** 0.0013* 0.0029*** 0.0027*** 0.0012* 0.0005 0.0006 0.0020*** 0.0010* 0.0010 0.0009 
 (0.078) (0.075) (0.290) (0.018) (0.054) (0.048) (0.137) (0.012) (0.012) (0.045) (0.030) (0.057) (0.008) (0.006) (0.053) (0.365) (0.234) (0.009) (0.090) (0.269) (0.315) 
PCB*DRD(50) -0.0020** -0.0013* -0.0015 -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0025* -0.0029** 0.0022** 0.0016** 0.0022** 0.0025*** 0.0026* 0.0017* 0.0022* 0.0019*** 0.0014** 0.0011* 0.0024*** 0.0015** 0.0014* 0.0024*** 
 (0.035) (0.086) (0.168) (0.274) (0.304) (0.073) (0.027) (0.016) (0.037) (0.016) (0.008) (0.062) (0.082) (0.054) (0.005) (0.011) (0.072) (0.003) (0.042) (0.083) (0.005) 
PCB*DRD(70) -0.0011 -0.0007 -0.0010 -0.0014* -0.0009 -0.0016 -0.0018 0.0009 0.0003 0.0004 0.0019* 0.0017 0.0018* 0.0019** 0.0019** 0.0018*** 0.0017** 0.0011 0.0031** 0.0015* 0.0010 
 (0.182) (0.256) (0.260) (0.077) (0.126) (0.127) (0.277) (0.232) (0.668) (0.656) (0.085) (0.224) (0.061) (0.040) (0.013) (0.009) (0.019) (0.318) (0.018) (0.090) (0.361) 
PCB*DRD(40)   -0.0022**                   
   (0.045)                   
Notes: 1-step system GMM estimations of equation (1) on different subsamples. The lag order of GMM level instruments is maximized at 2. Legal origin and imperial legacy dummies are involved as standard 
instruments in each case. From each regression, only the coefficient of the PCB*DRD(#) interaction term is presented. P-values of the t-tests are in parenthesis and are calculated according to standard errors 
which are robust to heteroskedasticity across and arbitrary pattern of autocorrelation within countries. Asterisks denote the significance level (*: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%). Not significant results are depicted in bold. 
Samples: full – full sample (default), Smpl1 – without Caucasus (ARM, AZE, GEO), Smpl2 – without Central Asia (KAZ, KGZ, TJK, MNG), Smpl3 – without Eastern Europe (BLR, MDA, RUS, UKR),  
               Smpl4 – without the Baltic (EST, LTU, LVA), Smpl5 – without Central Europe (CZE, HUN, POL, SVK, SVN), Smpl6 – without South-East Europe (ALB, BGR, BIH, HRV, MKD, ROU, SRB). 
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Table A5. Summary table of the growth-finance literature on transition countries 
Paper Sample Nonlinearity2 Estimation method FD measures Main results 
Cojocaru et al. 
(2016) 
25 transition countries 
(1990-2008)  
not considered System GMM PC, LL, IRS, OC, 
bank concentration rate 
OC and IRS have large (-) effect on growth. PC tends to be irrelevant when financial 
efficiency measures are also included in the regression. Banking efficiency is more 
important for growth, than the size of the banking sector. 
Caporale et al. 
(2015) 




System GMM average of the EBRD 
financial TIs3,  
PCB, LL, IRS, SMC  
PCB is not relevant for growth. LL and SMC have small (+) effects on growth. 
The average of the EBRD financial TIs has large (+) effect, while IRS has large (-) 
effect on growth. 
Gaffeo and 
Garalova (2014) 
13 transition countries 
(1995-2007) 
not considered Error correction model 
(difference GMM) 
TF14, DC, LL Each FD measure has (+) long-run effect on output. The short-run effect of FD is 
ambiguous (either not significant or significantly negative). 
Zhang et al. 
(2012) 
286 Chinese cities  
(2001-2006)  
not considered System GMM, 
Difference GMM 
total credit, total deposit,  
households’ deposit etc.  
Size-based measures of financial development positively affect growth in China. 
Djalilov and 
Piesse (2011) 
27 transition countries 
(1992-2008) 
not considered OLS, simultaneous  
equations model 
PC, IRS, average of the 
EBRD financial TIs3 
The average of the EBRD financial TIs has (-) effect on growth. PC has no effect 
on growth. IRS has small (-) effect on growth. 






OLS DC, PC, SMC,  
bonds outstanding,  
TFI16, TFI27  
Transition countries: The amount of bonds, DC, TFI1 and TFI2 have (+) effect, 
while PC and SMC have no effect on growth.8 
Masten et al. 
(2008) 1 
28 EU and 4 non-EU 
countries (1996-2004)  
sample splitting 
(non-transition/  
transition countries)    
Difference GMM 
 
TF25, PC, international  
financial integration (IFI)  
measures 
Transition countries: IFI has (+) effect on growth. TF2 and PC have no effect on 
growth. However, financial development strengthens the positive effect of 
international financial integration on growth.8 
Coricelli and 
Masten (2004) 
9 Central European 
countries (1993-2003)   
Interaction  
(PC_growth*BRIL) 
GMM IRS, PC,  
EBRD financial TIs3 
IRS has (-) effect, while BRIL has (+) effect on growth. The overall effect of credit 
growth depends on institutional quality: main effect (-), interaction with BRIL (+). 
Botric and 
Slijepcevic (2008) 
6 South-East European 
countries (1995-2005) 
not considered Fixed effects model 
(GLS) 
IRS, NPL IRS has large (-) effect on growth. NPL is not relevant. 
Harper and 
McNulty (2008) 
115 transition and other 
countries (1996-2009)   
not considered Claims regressed by 
OLS and simultaneous 
equations technique 
Claims of the banking 
sector on the private 
sector 
The size of the financial system is smaller in transition countries than in other 
countries even after controlling for legal origin, rule of law, and other economic 
factors. Bank lending is even smaller in countries of Russian legal origin. 
Koivu and Sutela 
(2005) 
25 transition countries 
(1993-2001) 
not considered Fixed effects model IRS, PCB 
 
IRS has (-) effect on growth. The effect of PCB is ambiguous. Size is not a good 
proxy for financial development in transition economies. 
Gillman and 
Harris (2004) 




Fixed effects model (IV 
estimation), Random 
effects model, GMM 
LL  
 
‘Liquid liabilities’ exerts (-), while its interaction with the inflation rate exerts 
(+) effect on growth. 
Dawson (2003) 13 transition countries 
(1994-99) 
not considered Fixed effects model, 
Random effects model 
LL  
 
‘Liquid liabilities’ is not relevant for growth. 




Fixed effects model PCB, IRS  IRS has (-) effect, while PCB has no effect on growth. The results on the CIS/CESEE 
subsamples are the same except that PCB is relevant for growth in CIS countries. 
Notes: 1 Masten et al. (2008) perform an industry-level analysis as well; 2 ‘sample splitting’ refers to the arbitrary splitting of the sample into different subgroups marked in parenthesis; 3 EBRD financial transition 
indicators: ‘Banking reform & interest rate liberalization’ TI, ‘Securities markets & non-bank financial institutions’ TI; 4 TF1 (total finance 1) = PCB+SMC; 5 TF2 (total finance 2) = PC+SMC; 6 TFI1 (total 
financial intermediation 1) = DC+SMC+bonds; 7 TFI2 (total financial intermediation 2) = PC+SMC+bonds; 8 Only the results on transition countries are presented. 
Abbreviations: BRIL– ‘Banking reform & interest rate liberalization’ transition indicator, CESEE– Central Europe and South-East Europe, CIS– Commonwealth of Independent States, DC– domestic credit 
(incl. credit to the public sector) granted by the financial sector (incl. banks, monetary authorities etc.), FD– financial development, IRS– bank lending-deposit interest rate spread, LL– liquid liabilities, NPL– 
non-performing loans, OC– overhead costs of the banking sector, PC– private credit granted by the financial sector (incl. banks, monetary authorities etc.), PCB– private credit granted by the banking sector, 





Table 1. Imperial affiliation in 1900 and legal origin 
  Dummies reflecting imperial affiliation in 1900 Legal origin dummy 
Country Code Russian Austro-
Hungarian 
German Ottoman Independent French Russian 
(CIS&MNG) 
Albania ALB 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Armenia ARM 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Azerbaijan AZE 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Belarus BLR 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Bosnia and  
Hercegovina 
BIH 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Bulgaria BGR 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Croatia HRV 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Czech Rep. CZE 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Estonia EST 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Macedonia MKD 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Georgia GEO 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Hungary HUN 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Kazakhstan KAZ 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Kyrgyz Rep. KGZ 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Latvia LVA 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lithuania LTU 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Moldova MDA 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Mongolia MNG 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Poland POL 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Romania ROU 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
Russia RUS 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Serbia SRB 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 
Slovakia SVK 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Slovenia SVN 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Tajikistan TJK 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Ukraine UKR 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
Source: Imperial affiliation dummies are own classifications. Independent is understood either literally or as non-
occupied by any of the four empires considered (i.e., Russian, German, Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian). French 
legal origin dummy is from La Porta et al. (2008). Russian legal origin dummy takes on a value of one for (present 
or past) Commonwealth of Independent States member countries and Mongolia. 
Notes: The data of Serbia on French legal origin dummy correspond to the data of ‘Serbia and Montenegro’ in 
the source dataset. 
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Table 2. Sensitivity to the sample: Summary of the FD=IRS and the FD=FI specifications 
DRD variable SHadj ELF6 GDw 
Sample full Smpl1 Smpl2 Smpl3 Smpl4 Smpl5 Smpl6 full Smpl1 Smpl2 Smpl3 Smpl4 Smpl5 Smpl6 full Smpl1 Smpl2 Smpl3 Smpl4 Smpl5 Smpl6 
IRS*DRD(30) 0.0037 0.0036* 0.0097** -0.0004 0.0030 0.0047 0.0028 -0.0084** -0.0084* -0.0020 -0.0048* -0.0016 0.0013 -0.0020 0.0042 0.0011 0.0070** 0.0025 0.0036 0.0042 -0.0004 
 (0.137) (0.098) (0.021) (0.891) (0.387) (0.119) (0.175) (0.021) (0.054) (0.597) (0.057) (0.552) (0.564) (0.455) (0.201) (0.650) (0.044) (0.343) (0.159) (0.202) (0.898) 
IRS*DRD(50) 0.0033 0.0039* 0.0085* 0.0029 0.0023 0.0037 0.0038** -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0032 -0.0003 0.0004 -0.0051 0.0001 0.0025 0.0032 0.0065** 0.0004 0.0044 0.0024 -0.0005 
 (0.159) (0.069) (0.094) (0.327) (0.440) (0.190) (0.018) (0.852) (0.982) (0.384) (0.927) (0.813) (0.227) (0.976) (0.444) (0.280) (0.038) (0.907) (0.111) (0.458) (0.860) 
IRS*DRD(70) 0.0077 0.0110*** 0.0049 0.0035 0.0042 0.0059 0.0061* -0.0049* -0.0049** -0.0104*** -0.0040 -0.0027 -0.0024 -0.0035 -0.0078** -0.0062* 0.0087*** -0.0100*** -0.0004 -0.0081** 0.0011 
 (0.131) (0.009) (0.365) (0.483) (0.390) (0.172) (0.077) (0.069) (0.038) (0.003) (0.225) (0.224) (0.425) (0.273) (0.030) (0.067) (0.000) (0.003) (0.902) (0.039) (0.656) 
IRS*DRD(40)    0.0017 0.0012 0.0066**      0.0000 -0.0025 -0.0001     0.0046*  0.0014 
    (0.511) (0.635) (0.046)      (0.991) (0.490) (0.953)     (0.090)  (0.557) 
IRS*DRD(60)    0.0035 0.0028 0.0053      -0.0021 -0.0039 -0.0045**     0.0021  -0.0035 
    (0.230) (0.508) (0.174)      (0.480) (0.192) (0.032)     (0.529)  (0.219) 
FI*DRD(30) -0.1494 -0.1678 -0.0998 -0.2821** -0.1477 -0.1942* -0.1549 0.2043** 0.1383** 0.1981** 0.1946** 0.1061 0.4061*** 0.2347** 0.1618** 0.0631 0.1134 0.1847** 0.1045 0.0941 0.0950 
 (0.153) (0.142) (0.368) (0.019) (0.188) (0.081) (0.253) (0.042) (0.034) (0.046) (0.021) (0.145) (0.007) (0.032) (0.034) (0.273) (0.128) (0.025) (0.161) (0.327) (0.253) 
FI*DRD(50) -0.2445** -0.1722** -0.1689 -0.1366 -0.1446 -0.3434* -0.3183** 0.2797** 0.2010* 0.2815** 0.3126*** 0.3485** 0.2339 0.2914* 0.1865*** 0.1552*** 0.1127 0.2251** 0.1842** 0.1329 0.2993*** 
 (0.041) (0.046) (0.223) (0.214) (0.191) (0.071) (0.030) (0.025) (0.095) (0.026) (0.005) (0.018) (0.124) (0.099) (0.005) (0.009) (0.112) (0.025) (0.014) (0.131) (0.006) 
FI*DRD(70) -0.1062 -0.0635 -0.1219 -0.1576* -0.1000 -0.1473 -0.1591 0.0779 -0.0502 -0.0527 0.2117 0.1937 0.2306** 0.2394** 0.1900* 0.1916** 0.1876* 0.0884 0.3243*** 0.1892 0.1354 
 (0.218) (0.335) (0.211) (0.074) (0.133) (0.188) (0.309) (0.433) (0.485) (0.700) (0.132) (0.262) (0.038) (0.048) (0.081) (0.049) (0.077) (0.481) (0.007) (0.141) (0.313) 
FI*DRD(40)   -0.2355*  -0.1442               0.1558**  
   (0.094)  (0.199)               (0.047)  
FI*DRD(60)   -0.0484  -0.1152               0.2619**  
   (0.585)  (0.139)               (0.028)  
Notes: 1-step system GMM estimations of equation (1) on different subsamples. The lag order of GMM level instruments is maximized at 2. Legal origin and imperial legacy dummies are involved as standard 
instruments in each case. From each regression, only the coefficient of the FD*DRD(#) interaction term is presented. P-values of the t-tests are in parenthesis and are calculated according to standard errors which 
are robust to heteroskedasticity across and arbitrary pattern of autocorrelation within countries. Asterisks denote the significance level (*: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%). Not significant results are depicted in bold. When 
the break is not significant at the standard levels at any of the three default cut off points, the results on the 40th and the 60th percentiles of the underlying DRD variable as cut off points are also presented. 
Samples: full – full sample (default), Smpl1 – without Caucasus (ARM, AZE, GEO), Smpl2 – without Central Asia (KAZ, KGZ, TJK, MNG), Smpl3 – without Eastern Europe (BLR, MDA, RUS, UKR),  




Table 3. Sensitivity to the dependent variable 
FD variable FI PCB IRS 
Dependent 
variable (DV) 
Default DV1 DV2 Default DV1 DV2 Default DV1 DV2 
FD -0.2817*** -0.0952 -0.0890 -0.0019*** -0.0014* -0.0008 0.0034 0.0008 0.0067 
 (0.003) (0.335) (0.435) (0.003) (0.053) (0.256) (0.420) (0.823) (0.338) 
ELF6 -0.2813* -0.2586* -0.2683* -0.2771* -0.2549* -0.3059** 0.0425 -0.0559 0.2122 
 (0.074) (0.064) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.024) (0.687) (0.575) (0.141) 
FD*ELF6(30) 0.2043** 0.1389 0.2469*** 0.0023** 0.0015* 0.0028*** -0.0084** -0.0052* -0.0144* 
 (0.042) (0.104) (0.007) (0.012) (0.056) (0.001) (0.021) (0.075) (0.052) 
FD -0.2541*** -0.0751 -0.0507 -0.0020*** -0.0016** -0.0008 -0.0058*** -0.0041* -0.0057** 
 (0.004) (0.397) (0.688) (0.002) (0.026) (0.223) (0.009) (0.053) (0.013) 
ELF6 -0.3606** -0.3273** -0.3674** -0.2805* -0.2704** -0.3098** -0.1080 -0.0999 0.0433 
 (0.024) (0.016) (0.020) (0.054) (0.031) (0.028) (0.295) (0.244) (0.610) 
FD*ELF6(50) 0.2797** 0.2071** 0.3405** 0.0022** 0.0017** 0.0027*** -0.0004 -0.0020 -0.0041 
 (0.025) (0.022) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.009) (0.852) (0.319) (0.160) 
FD -0.2036** -0.0324 0.0085 -0.0010 -0.0008 0.0002 -0.0017 -0.0018 -0.0044** 
 (0.023) (0.710) (0.953) (0.106) (0.154) (0.795) (0.567) (0.468) (0.014) 
ELF6 -0.1843 -0.2095** -0.1845 -0.1661 -0.1903* -0.1912 -0.0097 -0.0444 0.0705 
 (0.159) (0.042) (0.194) (0.191) (0.083) (0.140) (0.919) (0.576) (0.460) 
FD*ELF6(70) 0.0779 0.0938 0.1472 0.0009 0.0007 0.0015 -0.0049* -0.0048** -0.0059** 
 (0.433) (0.284) (0.221) (0.232) (0.262) (0.112) (0.069) (0.025) (0.014) 
FD -0.2694** -0.0891 -0.0341 -0.0005 -0.0006 0.0010 -0.0067** -0.0056** -0.0118*** 
 (0.039) (0.354) (0.865) (0.472) (0.318) (0.299) (0.011) (0.017) (0.000) 
SHadj 0.6171** 0.6533*** 0.6706** 0.4897* 0.5506*** 0.5839** 0.1100 0.1429 0.0118 
 (0.031) (0.006) (0.039) (0.061) (0.005) (0.033) (0.532) (0.204) (0.949) 
FD*SHadj(30) -0.1494 -0.1797* -0.1860 -0.0016* -0.0017** -0.0018* 0.0037 0.0034* 0.0067** 
 (0.153) (0.054) (0.167) (0.078) (0.014) (0.072) (0.137) (0.087) (0.011) 
FD -0.1805 -0.0699 0.1171 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0018* -0.0063** -0.0059*** -0.0099*** 
 (0.218) (0.590) (0.528) (0.861) (0.651) (0.055) (0.016) (0.006) (0.000) 
SHadj 0.8333** 0.8051*** 1.0829*** 0.6041* 0.6262** 0.8531*** 0.0503 -0.0080 0.0266 
 (0.018) (0.008) (0.003) (0.051) (0.011) (0.003) (0.796) (0.957) (0.897) 
FD*SHadj(50) -0.2445** -0.2342** -0.3854*** -0.0020** -0.0020** -0.0033*** 0.0033 0.0047** 0.0047* 
 (0.041) (0.029) (0.004) (0.035) (0.011) (0.001) (0.159) (0.033) (0.079) 
FD -0.3417*** -0.1881* -0.1384 -0.0009 -0.0010 0.0007 -0.0055*** -0.0041*** -0.0088*** 
 (0.001) (0.094) (0.227) (0.159) (0.104) (0.341) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) 
SHadj 0.5366** 0.5543** 0.6233*** 0.3991 0.4495** 0.6022*** 0.0602 0.1592 0.1127 
 (0.046) (0.019) (0.007) (0.114) (0.039) (0.007) (0.781) (0.398) (0.529) 
FD*SHadj(70) -0.1062 -0.1199 -0.1721** -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0023*** 0.0077 0.0050 0.0076 
 (0.218) (0.133) (0.031) (0.182) (0.122) (0.008) (0.131) (0.176) (0.163) 
FD -0.4573*** -0.1964** -0.2174 -0.0023*** -0.0022*** -0.0005 -0.0060** -0.0054*** -0.0132*** 
 (0.003) (0.033) (0.268) (0.001) (0.001) (0.669) (0.011) (0.008) (0.001) 
GDw -0.0002** -0.0001** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001** -0.0002* 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.130) (0.108) (0.035) (0.225) (0.109) (0.042) (0.063) 
FD*GDw(30) 0.1618** 0.1035* 0.1276 0.0012* 0.0011** 0.0008 0.0042 0.0041 0.0100** 
 (0.034) (0.087) (0.139) (0.053) (0.035) (0.331) (0.201) (0.130) (0.026) 
FD -0.3591*** -0.1778* -0.1326 -0.0024*** -0.0024*** -0.0010 -0.0050*** -0.0055*** -0.0119*** 
 (0.006) (0.066) (0.443) (0.001) (0.001) (0.272) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
GDw -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002*** -0.0002* -0.0001 -0.0001** -0.0001 
 (0.009) (0.001) (0.037) (0.026) (0.003) (0.057) (0.222) (0.049) (0.153) 
FD*GDw(50) 0.1865*** 0.1789*** 0.2189** 0.0019*** 0.0018*** 0.0019** 0.0025 0.0044* 0.0069* 
 (0.005) (0.000) (0.033) (0.005) (0.000) (0.030) (0.444) (0.089) (0.069) 
FD -0.2683*** -0.0879 -0.0440 -0.0021*** -0.0019*** -0.0002 0.0004 -0.0014 -0.0057* 
 (0.002) (0.329) (0.719) (0.002) (0.005) (0.849) (0.889) (0.610) (0.095) 
GDw -0.0002* -0.0002** -0.0002 -0.0002* -0.0002** -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.080) (0.023) (0.247) (0.052) (0.020) (0.242) (0.523) (0.638) (0.848) 
FD*GDw(70) 0.1900* 0.2122** 0.1607 0.0019** 0.0016** 0.0010 -0.0078** -0.0023 -0.0034 
 (0.081) (0.036) (0.309) (0.013) (0.017) (0.263) (0.030) (0.363) (0.387) 
Notes: 1-step system GMM estimations of equation (1) in the case of different dependent variables. In the case of ‘DV1’, the 
dependent variable is the log GDP per capita calculated according to the ‘rgdpna’ output series and the population series of 
PWT 9.0. In the case of ‘DV2’, the dependent variable is the log GDP per worker calculated according to the ‘rgdpo’ output 
series and the employment series of PWT 9.0. The lag order of GMM level instruments is maximized at 2. Legal origin and 
imperial legacy dummies are involved as standard instruments in each case. The constant and the coefficients of the ‘conditioning 
set’ including the lagged dependent variable are omitted to save space. P-values of the t-tests are in parenthesis and are calculated 
according to standard errors which are robust to heteroskedasticity across and arbitrary pattern of autocorrelation within countries. 
Asterisks denote the significance level (*: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%). The results are presented in a block-wise structure and each 
FD-DRD-DRD(#) specification is framed by a dashed line.  
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Table 4A. Sensitivity to the control variables I. 







































FD -0.2817*** -0.2765*** -0.2810** -0.2582*** -0.2335* -0.2660*** -0.0019*** -0.0019*** -0.0018** -0.0020*** -0.0017 -0.0019*** 0.0034 0.0030 0.0034 0.0031 0.0037 0.0032 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.014) (0.004) (0.062) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.001) (0.140) (0.003) (0.420) (0.457) (0.397) (0.472) (0.399) (0.449) 
ELF6 -0.2813* -0.2879* -0.2892* -0.2731* -0.3273* -0.2834* -0.2771* -0.2868** -0.2838* -0.2957* -0.3503** -0.2785* 0.0425 0.0209 0.0392 0.0498 0.1034 0.0405 
 (0.074) (0.051) (0.055) (0.086) (0.084) (0.075) (0.067) (0.047) (0.061) (0.067) (0.044) (0.068) (0.687) (0.839) (0.702) (0.622) (0.350) (0.703) 
FD*ELF6(30) 0.2043** 0.2000** 0.2055** 0.1981** 0.2639** 0.2049** 0.0023** 0.0023*** 0.0023** 0.0024*** 0.0032*** 0.0023** -0.0084** -0.0081** -0.0082** -0.0083** -0.0105** -0.0085** 
 (0.042) (0.028) (0.027) (0.039) (0.030) (0.046) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.002) (0.013) (0.021) (0.028) (0.015) (0.028) (0.013) (0.023) 
AR#  0.0014 0.0011 -0.0001 0.0294 -0.0147  0.0011 -0.0020 0.0002 0.0211 -0.0002  0.0018 -0.0014 -0.0002 0.0164 -0.0076 
  (0.802) (0.720) (0.746) (0.193) (0.329)  (0.816) (0.537) (0.692) (0.436) (0.990)  (0.637) (0.636) (0.637) (0.663) (0.679) 
FD -0.2541*** -0.2524*** -0.2571** -0.2641*** -0.2107* -0.2545*** -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0021*** -0.0020*** -0.0023** -0.0019*** -0.0058*** -0.0060*** -0.0051** -0.0061*** -0.0078*** -0.0061*** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.036) (0.004) (0.086) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.001) (0.040) (0.002) (0.009) (0.006) (0.017) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) 
ELF6 -0.3606** -0.3522** -0.3578** -0.3451** -0.4426** -0.3681** -0.2805* -0.2719** -0.2827** -0.2931* -0.3427** -0.2859* -0.1080 -0.1242 -0.1017 -0.0879 -0.0917 -0.1137 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.019) (0.045) (0.018) (0.023) (0.054) (0.043) (0.044) (0.063) (0.046) (0.053) (0.295) (0.247) (0.315) (0.376) (0.395) (0.271) 
FD*ELF6(50) 0.2797** 0.2749** 0.2704** 0.2462** 0.3948*** 0.2852** 0.0022** 0.0022** 0.0022** 0.0022** 0.0031*** 0.0022** -0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0003 
 (0.025) (0.031) (0.026) (0.044) (0.009) (0.023) (0.016) (0.018) (0.012) (0.020) (0.008) (0.016) (0.852) (0.659) (0.673) (0.814) (0.780) (0.902) 
AR#  -0.0008 0.0026 0.0001 0.0316 0.0002  -0.0002 0.0004 0.0002 0.0391 0.0023  0.0036 -0.0025 -0.0004 0.0015 -0.0141 
  (0.878) (0.429) (0.774) (0.198) (0.992)  (0.962) (0.906) (0.581) (0.128) (0.923)  (0.340) (0.329) (0.358) (0.970) (0.462) 
FD -0.2036** -0.2146** -0.1837 -0.1878** -0.1027 -0.2001** -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0010* -0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0017 -0.0019 -0.0014 -0.0024 -0.0034 -0.0015 
 (0.023) (0.029) (0.135) (0.044) (0.488) (0.027) (0.106) (0.103) (0.231) (0.077) (0.887) (0.160) (0.567) (0.483) (0.615) (0.322) (0.116) (0.637) 
ELF6 -0.1843 -0.1845 -0.1682 -0.1635 -0.1929 -0.1868 -0.1661 -0.1675 -0.1667 -0.1788 -0.1922 -0.1688 -0.0097 -0.0269 -0.0063 0.0399 0.0425 0.0002 
 (0.159) (0.130) (0.195) (0.305) (0.219) (0.163) (0.191) (0.147) (0.184) (0.216) (0.206) (0.189) (0.919) (0.784) (0.945) (0.654) (0.678) (0.998) 
FD*ELF6(70) 0.0779 0.0823 0.0462 0.0491 0.0816 0.0766 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0010 0.0009 0.0009 -0.0049* -0.0055** -0.0052** -0.0056** -0.0064** -0.0055* 
 (0.433) (0.417) (0.643) (0.683) (0.538) (0.459) (0.232) (0.217) (0.251) (0.235) (0.331) (0.257) (0.069) (0.023) (0.048) (0.022) (0.016) (0.053) 
AR#  -0.0009 0.0008 -0.0001 0.0212 -0.0080  0.0000 -0.0008 0.0001 0.0168 -0.0064  0.0039 -0.0018 -0.0006* 0.0357 -0.0293 
  (0.874) (0.798) (0.902) (0.412) (0.674)  (0.998) (0.807) (0.868) (0.558) (0.745)  (0.280) (0.470) (0.085) (0.282) (0.138) 
FD -0.2694** -0.2554* -0.2146 -0.2291 -0.1726 -0.2723** -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0067** -0.0090*** -0.0069*** -0.0070*** -0.0096*** -0.0067** 
 (0.039) (0.083) (0.153) (0.113) (0.318) (0.048) (0.472) (0.643) (0.745) (0.562) (0.770) (0.517) (0.011) (0.001) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.013) 
SHadj 0.6171** 0.6228** 0.6038** 0.6024** 0.5713* 0.6071** 0.4897* 0.5145* 0.5072* 0.5183* 0.4786 0.4768* 0.1100 0.1296 0.1663 0.0786 0.0401 0.0935 
 (0.031) (0.029) (0.049) (0.042) (0.074) (0.033) (0.061) (0.055) (0.078) (0.062) (0.116) (0.066) (0.532) (0.506) (0.377) (0.635) (0.817) (0.594) 
FD*SHadj(30) -0.1494 -0.1498 -0.1410 -0.1604 -0.1447 -0.1500 -0.0016* -0.0017* -0.0015* -0.0018** -0.0016 -0.0016* 0.0037 0.0067** 0.0035 0.0034* 0.0045* 0.0039 
 (0.153) (0.166) (0.181) (0.116) (0.255) (0.155) (0.078) (0.078) (0.099) (0.049) (0.153) (0.081) (0.137) (0.014) (0.145) (0.090) (0.077) (0.143) 
AR#  0.0019 -0.0009 -0.0001 0.0311 0.0007  0.0019 -0.0025 0.0001 0.0362 -0.0046  0.0106** -0.0034 -0.0004 0.0246 -0.0243 
  (0.761) (0.782) (0.782) (0.252) (0.971)  (0.729) (0.517) (0.772) (0.184) (0.810)  (0.013) (0.220) (0.393) (0.494) (0.188) 
FD -0.1805 -0.1499 -0.1588 -0.1565 -0.0645 -0.1626 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0063** -0.0079*** -0.0060*** -0.0066** -0.0089*** -0.0063** 
 (0.218) (0.351) (0.325) (0.294) (0.748) (0.266) (0.861) (0.801) (1.000) (0.829) (0.821) (0.950) (0.016) (0.003) (0.008) (0.010) (0.002) (0.017) 
SHadj 0.8333** 0.9110*** 0.8102** 0.8293** 0.8536** 0.8122** 0.6041* 0.6897** 0.6133* 0.6638** 0.6106* 0.5845* 0.0503 0.0481 0.1106 0.0109 -0.1177 0.0359 
 (0.018) (0.008) (0.026) (0.028) (0.041) (0.021) (0.051) (0.025) (0.066) (0.043) (0.091) (0.060) (0.796) (0.816) (0.580) (0.951) (0.572) (0.862) 
FD*SHadj(50) -0.2445** -0.2636** -0.2401** -0.2499** -0.2841** -0.2443** -0.0020** -0.0023** -0.0020** -0.0023** -0.0022** -0.0020** 0.0033 0.0051 0.0028 0.0033* 0.0054** 0.0035 
 (0.041) (0.024) (0.047) (0.036) (0.034) (0.043) (0.035) (0.014) (0.048) (0.021) (0.044) (0.040) (0.159) (0.102) (0.215) (0.099) (0.041) (0.185) 
AR#  0.0049 0.0004 0.0001 0.0382 -0.0184  0.0041 -0.0018 0.0003 0.0372 -0.0165  0.0079* -0.0024 -0.0005 0.0110 -0.0231 
  (0.342) (0.912) (0.868) (0.187) (0.308)  (0.409) (0.646) (0.545) (0.188) (0.338)  (0.082) (0.414) (0.260) (0.794) (0.226) 
FD -0.3417*** -0.2955** -0.3062*** -0.3087*** -0.2532* -0.3357*** -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0055*** -0.0054*** -0.0058*** -0.0053*** -0.0071*** -0.0054*** 
 (0.001) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.093) (0.001) (0.159) (0.235) (0.330) (0.166) (0.843) (0.187) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
SHadj 0.5366** 0.6949** 0.5305* 0.4984* 0.5564* 0.5134* 0.3991 0.4756** 0.4319 0.4283 0.4446 0.3852 0.0602 0.0973 0.1054 0.0449 0.0735 0.0600 
 (0.046) (0.010) (0.052) (0.096) (0.094) (0.059) (0.114) (0.049) (0.111) (0.103) (0.145) (0.129) (0.781) (0.660) (0.626) (0.827) (0.754) (0.784) 
FD*SHadj(70) -0.1062 -0.1770** -0.1079 -0.1017 -0.1465 -0.1003 -0.0011 -0.0015* -0.0011 -0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0010 0.0077 0.0067 0.0084* 0.0073 0.0065 0.0076 
 (0.218) (0.032) (0.213) (0.235) (0.200) (0.243) (0.182) (0.070) (0.195) (0.117) (0.127) (0.197) (0.131) (0.211) (0.085) (0.128) (0.214) (0.142) 
AR#  0.0062 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0327 -0.0048  0.0029 -0.0025 0.0001 0.0305 -0.0106  0.0009 -0.0043 -0.0004 0.0096 -0.0039 
  (0.223) (0.957) (0.840) (0.209) (0.776)  (0.555) (0.486) (0.791) (0.255) (0.501)  (0.831) (0.176) (0.383) (0.810) (0.853) 
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Table 4A. (cont.) 







































FD -0.4573*** -0.4531*** -0.4236*** -0.4462*** -0.5570** -0.4571*** -0.0023*** -0.0023*** -0.0024*** -0.0024*** -0.0034*** -0.0023*** -0.0060** -0.0061*** -0.0053** -0.0058** -0.0081*** -0.0060** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.011) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.011) (0.008) (0.013) (0.012) (0.002) (0.011) 
GDw -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002* -0.0002* -0.0002** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.028) (0.030) (0.026) (0.062) (0.051) (0.029) (0.108) (0.104) (0.104) (0.147) (0.105) (0.113) (0.109) (0.120) (0.138) (0.241) (0.120) (0.105) 
FD*GDw(30) 0.1618** 0.1730** 0.1648** 0.1513** 0.2525* 0.1615** 0.0012* 0.0013* 0.0013** 0.0012* 0.0021** 0.0012** 0.0042 0.0042 0.0040 0.0032 0.0061* 0.0042 
 (0.034) (0.031) (0.028) (0.031) (0.051) (0.033) (0.053) (0.066) (0.045) (0.055) (0.035) (0.049) (0.201) (0.216) (0.169) (0.255) (0.072) (0.201) 
AR#  0.0007 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0501* 0.0005  0.0011 -0.0010 0.0000 0.0613* -0.0068  0.0016 -0.0011 -0.0003 0.0111 -0.0055 
  (0.902) (0.968) (0.819) (0.087) (0.979)  (0.830) (0.718) (0.959) (0.066) (0.712)  (0.729) (0.709) (0.523) (0.773) (0.772) 
FD -0.3591*** -0.3528** -0.3205** -0.3496*** -0.3376** -0.3497*** -0.0024*** -0.0024*** -0.0025*** -0.0024*** -0.0030*** -0.0024*** -0.0050*** -0.0049*** -0.0043*** -0.0047*** -0.0075*** -0.0050*** 
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.024) (0.008) (0.044) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) 
GDw -0.0002*** -0.0002** -0.0002*** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002*** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.018) (0.024) (0.008) (0.026) (0.025) (0.021) (0.038) (0.027) (0.026) (0.222) (0.256) (0.277) (0.370) (0.232) (0.228) 
FD*GDw(50) 0.1865*** 0.1886*** 0.2007** 0.1884*** 0.2084** 0.1946*** 0.0019*** 0.0020*** 0.0021*** 0.0020*** 0.0024*** 0.0021*** 0.0025 0.0022 0.0022 0.0017 0.0036 0.0023 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.014) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.444) (0.493) (0.492) (0.527) (0.230) (0.465) 
AR#  -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0002 0.0419 -0.0167  0.0012 -0.0014 -0.0001 0.0571** -0.0221  0.0013 -0.0010 -0.0004 0.0139 -0.0025 
  (0.853) (0.726) (0.553) (0.119) (0.460)  (0.823) (0.622) (0.791) (0.049) (0.314)  (0.788) (0.737) (0.393) (0.714) (0.905) 
FD -0.2683*** -0.2645*** -0.2401** -0.2531*** -0.1938* -0.2543*** -0.0021*** -0.0020*** -0.0022*** -0.0019*** -0.0021** -0.0020*** 0.0004 0.0000 0.0010 0.0002 -0.0037 0.0006 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.018) (0.004) (0.094) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.029) (0.003) (0.889) (0.992) (0.754) (0.942) (0.169) (0.855) 
GDw -0.0002* -0.0002 -0.0002* -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002* -0.0002* -0.0002** -0.0002* -0.0002* -0.0002 -0.0002** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 
 (0.080) (0.100) (0.075) (0.116) (0.166) (0.072) (0.052) (0.049) (0.054) (0.071) (0.119) (0.049) (0.523) (0.530) (0.269) (0.378) (0.665) (0.475) 
FD*GDw(70) 0.1900* 0.1842 0.2000* 0.1557 0.1855 0.1998* 0.0019** 0.0019** 0.0019** 0.0018** 0.0019** 0.0020** -0.0078** -0.0071** -0.0093*** -0.0080** -0.0045 -0.0080** 
 (0.081) (0.119) (0.081) (0.115) (0.144) (0.066) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.023) (0.011) (0.030) (0.027) (0.007) (0.016) (0.172) (0.027) 
AR#  -0.0004 0.0004 -0.0004 0.0268 -0.0142  0.0011 -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0466 -0.0164  0.0006 -0.0032 -0.0003 0.0351 -0.0157 
  (0.951) (0.897) (0.375) (0.314) (0.408)  (0.842) (0.921) (0.526) (0.119) (0.353)  (0.890) (0.259) (0.436) (0.256) (0.527) 
Notes: 1-step system GMM estimations of the following regression: [ ]1 2 3 4ln( ) ( (#) )  #Tit i it i it i it it ity FD DRD FD DRD conditioning set ARα β β β γ β ε= + + + ⋅ + + + , where the ‘conditioning set’ is the 
default set of control variables including the lagged dependent variable (see section 4), and AR# is the additional control variable. In the case of AR1, the additional control variable is the general 
government final consumption expenditure (unit: % of GDP, data source: WDI, notes: period average). In the case of AR2, the additional control variable is the inward flow of foreign direct 
investments (unit: % of GDP; data source: UN Conference on Trade and Development; notes: 1. period average, 2. data for Serbia between 1994 and 2007 correspond to the data for Serbia and 
Montenegro (FR Yugoslavia) in the respective years). In the case of AR3, the additional control variable is the volume of foreign trade (unit: % of GDP, data source: WDI, notes: period average). In 
the case of AR4, the additional control variable is a banking crisis dummy, which takes on a value of one if there was a systemic banking crisis in the given 3-year period according to the dataset 
of Luc Laeven and Fabián Valencia and zero otherwise (data source: Laeven, L., Valencia, F., 2012. Systemic Banking Crises Database: An Update. IMF Working Paper no.WP/12/163; notes: 
data are not available after 2011, consequently the estimations are run on the 3-year panel of 1994 and 2011). In the case of AR5, the additional control variable is an EU dummy which takes 
on a value of one if the country was a member of the European Union at least in one year of the given 3-year period and zero otherwise.  
The lag order of GMM level instruments is maximized at 2. Legal origin and imperial legacy dummies are involved as standard instruments in each case. The constant and the coefficients of the 
default ‘conditioning set’ are omitted to save space. P-values of the t-tests are in parenthesis and are calculated according to standard errors which are robust to heteroskedasticity across and arbitrary 
pattern of autocorrelation within countries. Asterisks denote the significance level (*: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%). Structural breaks significant at the standard levels are depicted in bold. Additional 
regressors significant at the standard levels are depicted in bold italics. The results are presented in a block-wise structure and each FD-DRD-DRD(#) specification is framed by a dashed line.  
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Table 4B. Sensitivity to the control variables II. 
DRD variable ELF6 SHadj GDw 







































FD -0.2817*** -0.2587** -0.0019*** -0.0015** 0.0034 0.0038 -0.2694** -0.2510 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0067** -0.0073*** -0.4573*** -0.4040** -0.0023*** -0.0017*** -0.0060** -0.0063** 
 (0.003) (0.029) (0.003) (0.018) (0.420) (0.357) (0.039) (0.124) (0.472) (0.621) (0.011) (0.005) (0.003) (0.027) (0.001) (0.003) (0.011) (0.011) 
DRD -0.2813* -0.2680* -0.2771* -0.2680* 0.0425 0.0767 0.6171** 0.5544* 0.4897* 0.4272 0.1100 0.0564 -0.0002** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.074) (0.086) (0.067) (0.071) (0.687) (0.463) (0.031) (0.057) (0.061) (0.106) (0.532) (0.729) (0.028) (0.100) (0.108) (0.204) (0.109) (0.154) 
FD*DRD(30) 0.2043** 0.2057** 0.0023** 0.0023*** -0.0084** -0.0091** -0.1494 -0.1434 -0.0016* -0.0014* 0.0037 0.0044* 0.1618** 0.1466* 0.0012* 0.0010* 0.0042 0.0037 
 (0.042) (0.030) (0.012) (0.007) (0.021) (0.014) (0.153) (0.154) (0.078) (0.087) (0.137) (0.090) (0.034) (0.069) (0.053) (0.093) (0.201) (0.143) 
Period (2003-05)  0.0368  0.0377*  0.0186  0.0369*  0.0351  0.0129  0.0327  0.0305  0.0158 
  (0.103)  (0.088)  (0.267)  (0.083)  (0.101)  (0.487)  (0.124)  (0.164)  (0.396) 
Period (2006-08)  0.0295  0.0263  -0.0050  0.0369  0.0374  -0.0058  0.0225  0.0201  -0.0072 
  (0.430)  (0.420)  (0.847)  (0.307)  (0.277)  (0.842)  (0.486)  (0.525)  (0.802) 
Period (2012-14)  -0.0411  -0.0415  -0.0818**  -0.0253  -0.0255  -0.0840***  -0.0362  -0.0366  -0.0709** 
  (0.300)  (0.197)  (0.012)  (0.508)  (0.455)  (0.006)  (0.329)  (0.290)  (0.029) 
FD -0.2541*** -0.2360** -0.0020*** -0.0016** -0.0058*** -0.0057** -0.1805 -0.1619 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0063** -0.0077*** -0.3591*** -0.3110** -0.0024*** -0.0019*** -0.0050*** -0.0057*** 
 (0.004) (0.047) (0.002) (0.019) (0.009) (0.014) (0.218) (0.324) (0.861) (0.855) (0.016) (0.002) (0.006) (0.028) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) 
DRD -0.3606** -0.3408** -0.2805* -0.2561* -0.1080 -0.0649 0.8333** 0.7353** 0.6041* 0.5383* 0.0503 -0.0472 -0.0002*** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002* -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.024) (0.035) (0.054) (0.080) (0.295) (0.510) (0.018) (0.046) (0.051) (0.090) (0.796) (0.807) (0.009) (0.024) (0.026) (0.059) (0.222) (0.239) 
FD*DRD(50) 0.2797** 0.2690** 0.0022** 0.0020** -0.0004 -0.0014 -0.2445** -0.2190* -0.0020** -0.0018* 0.0033 0.0045* 0.1865*** 0.1761*** 0.0019*** 0.0018*** 0.0025 0.0026 
 (0.025) (0.030) (0.016) (0.027) (0.852) (0.567) (0.041) (0.073) (0.035) (0.060) (0.159) (0.067) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.444) (0.314) 
Period (2003-05)  0.0405*  0.0391*  0.0182  0.0317  0.0306  0.0109  0.0314  0.0281  0.0171 
  (0.062)  (0.064)  (0.296)  (0.122)  (0.142)  (0.590)  (0.155)  (0.182)  (0.391) 
Period (2006-08)  0.0320  0.0345  -0.0029  0.0279  0.0240  -0.0089  0.0143  0.0129  -0.0085 
  (0.367)  (0.280)  (0.914)  (0.447)  (0.491)  (0.758)  (0.674)  (0.677)  (0.761) 
Period (2012-14)  -0.0310  -0.0280  -0.0760***  -0.0294  -0.0363  -0.0932***  -0.0393  -0.0331  -0.0718** 
  (0.385)  (0.371)  (0.009)  (0.444)  (0.316)  (0.004)  (0.311)  (0.348)  (0.024) 
FD -0.2036** -0.1929 -0.0010 -0.0006 -0.0017 -0.0015 -0.3417*** -0.2902** -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0055*** -0.0057*** -0.2683*** -0.2322** -0.0021*** -0.0016*** 0.0004 -0.0006 
 (0.023) (0.112) (0.106) (0.440) (0.567) (0.535) (0.001) (0.023) (0.159) (0.541) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.042) (0.002) (0.009) (0.889) (0.851) 
DRD -0.1843 -0.1760 -0.1661 -0.1580 -0.0097 0.0366 0.5366** 0.5039* 0.3991 0.3871 0.0602 0.0738 -0.0002* -0.0002 -0.0002* -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.159) (0.202) (0.191) (0.218) (0.919) (0.711) (0.046) (0.064) (0.114) (0.121) (0.781) (0.731) (0.080) (0.130) (0.052) (0.123) (0.523) (0.473) 
FD*DRD(70) 0.0779 0.0835 0.0009 0.0009 -0.0049* -0.0061** -0.1062 -0.1285 -0.0011 -0.0013 0.0077 0.0062 0.1900* 0.1722 0.0019** 0.0016** -0.0078** -0.0068** 
 (0.433) (0.419) (0.232) (0.271) (0.069) (0.017) (0.218) (0.132) (0.182) (0.105) (0.131) (0.198) (0.081) (0.100) (0.013) (0.035) (0.030) (0.033) 
Period (2003-05)  0.0417*  0.0389*  0.0154  0.0335  0.0298  0.0218  0.0324  0.0303  0.0257 
  (0.058)  (0.076)  (0.411)  (0.114)  (0.171)  (0.253)  (0.178)  (0.171)  (0.246) 
Period (2006-08)  0.0345  0.0278  -0.0050  0.0357  0.0253  0.0075  0.0171  0.0183  0.0017 
  (0.326)  (0.413)  (0.855)  (0.305)  (0.463)  (0.786)  (0.634)  (0.563)  (0.957) 
Period (2012-14)  -0.0334  -0.0400  -0.0829***  -0.0388  -0.0479  -0.0642**  -0.0417  -0.0328  -0.0548* 
  (0.364)  (0.231)  (0.008)  (0.256)  (0.162)  (0.027)  (0.307)  (0.357)  (0.086) 
Notes: 1-step system GMM estimations of the following regression: [ ] [ ]1 2 3ln( ) ( (#) )   T Tit i it i it i it t ity FD DRD FD DRD conditioning set period dummiesα β β β γ η ε= + + + ⋅ + + + , where the ‘conditioning set’ is 
the default set of control variables including the lagged dependent variable (see section 4), and the ‘period dummies’ is a vector of three period-dummies, notably those of 2003-05, 2006-08 and 2012-14. The 
dummies on the periods of 1994-96 and 1997-99 are neglected because in the system GMM estimation the first two time observations drop out from the sample. The dummy on the period of 2000-02 is also 
neglected to avoid perfect multicollinearity. Recall, that the ‘GlobalCrisis’ dummy, which is part of the default set of control variables, is a dummy on the period of 2009-11. 
The lag order of GMM level instruments is maximized at 2. Legal origin and imperial legacy dummies are involved as standard instruments in each case. The constant and the coefficients of the default 
‘conditioning set’ are omitted to save space. P-values of the t-tests are in parenthesis and are calculated according to standard errors which are robust to heteroskedasticity across and arbitrary pattern of 
autocorrelation within countries. Asterisks denote the significance level (*: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%). Structural breaks significant at the standard levels are depicted in bold. Additional period dummies 
significant at the standard levels are depicted in bold italics. The results are presented in a block-wise structure and each FD-DRD-DRD(#) specification is framed by a dashed line.    
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Table 5. Sensitivity to the data frequency 
FD variable FI PCB IRS 



























Method of instrument 
containment 
maxL maxL maxL&cl maxL maxL maxL&cl maxL maxL maxL&cl 
FD -0.2817*** -0.0326 -0.1439 -0.0019*** -0.0003 -0.0010 0.0034 -0.0001 -0.0030 
 (0.003) (0.384) (0.336) (0.003) (0.170) (0.245) (0.420) (0.812) (0.355) 
ELF6 -0.2813* -0.0712 -0.1071 -0.2771* -0.0700* -0.1067* 0.0425 0.0166 0.0128 
 (0.074) (0.105) (0.188) (0.067) (0.091) (0.080) (0.687) (0.407) (0.835) 
FD*ELF6(30) 0.2043** 0.0616* 0.1287 0.0023** 0.0007*** 0.0015** -0.0084** -0.0016*** -0.0014 
 (0.042) (0.058) (0.113) (0.012) (0.006) (0.022) (0.021) (0.009) (0.614) 
FD -0.2541*** -0.0203 -0.1062 -0.0020*** -0.0003 -0.0012 -0.0058*** -0.0017*** -0.0088** 
 (0.004) (0.585) (0.422) (0.002) (0.169) (0.177) (0.009) (0.000) (0.029) 
ELF6 -0.3606** -0.0738* -0.1387** -0.2805* -0.0592 -0.1282** -0.1080 -0.0154 -0.1116 
 (0.024) (0.066) (0.036) (0.054) (0.120) (0.018) (0.295) (0.536) (0.214) 
FD*ELF6(50) 0.2797** 0.0589* 0.1519** 0.0022** 0.0005** 0.0018** -0.0004 -0.0001 0.0032 
 (0.025) (0.056) (0.032) (0.016) (0.036) (0.012) (0.852) (0.919) (0.310) 
FD -0.2036** -0.0304 -0.1204 -0.0010 0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0017 -0.0013** -0.0052** 
 (0.023) (0.478) (0.330) (0.106) (0.964) (0.427) (0.567) (0.032) (0.016) 
ELF6 -0.1843 -0.0366 -0.0463 -0.1661 -0.0323 -0.0294 -0.0097 0.0132 0.0003 
 (0.159) (0.324) (0.317) (0.191) (0.362) (0.446) (0.919) (0.561) (0.996) 
FD*ELF6(70) 0.0779 0.0218 0.0556 0.0009 0.0002 0.0006 -0.0049* -0.0013* -0.0010 
 (0.433) (0.561) (0.215) (0.232) (0.372) (0.267) (0.069) (0.059) (0.537) 
FD -0.2694** -0.0097 -0.1217 -0.0005 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0067** -0.0024*** -0.0056*** 
 (0.039) (0.848) (0.348) (0.472) (0.992) (0.766) (0.011) (0.000) (0.001) 
SHadj 0.6171** 0.0732 0.0981 0.4897* 0.0714 0.0999 0.1100 0.0126 0.0308 
 (0.031) (0.373) (0.339) (0.061) (0.318) (0.353) (0.532) (0.770) (0.763) 
FD*SHadj(30) -0.1494 -0.0314 -0.0565 -0.0016* -0.0004 -0.0008 0.0037 0.0009** 0.0002 
 (0.153) (0.375) (0.365) (0.078) (0.158) (0.263) (0.137) (0.046) (0.923) 
FD -0.1805 0.0366 -0.0829 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0063** -0.0022*** -0.0061*** 
 (0.218) (0.560) (0.532) (0.861) (0.576) (0.822) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) 
SHadj 0.8333** 0.1619* 0.2028* 0.6041* 0.0990 0.1537 0.0503 0.0016 -0.1130 
 (0.018) (0.094) (0.088) (0.051) (0.193) (0.110) (0.796) (0.974) (0.227) 
FD*SHadj(50) -0.2445** -0.0744* -0.0919 -0.0020** -0.0005* -0.0009* 0.0033 0.0009 0.0024* 
 (0.041) (0.085) (0.146) (0.035) (0.097) (0.099) (0.159) (0.173) (0.062) 
FD -0.3417*** 0.0047 -0.1224 -0.0009 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0055*** -0.0019*** -0.0065*** 
 (0.001) (0.923) (0.357) (0.159) (0.863) (0.758) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
SHadj 0.5366** 0.1138* 0.1753** 0.3991 0.0615 0.1015 0.0602 0.0256 -0.0342 
 (0.046) (0.057) (0.048) (0.114) (0.330) (0.135) (0.781) (0.607) (0.755) 
FD*SHadj(70) -0.1062 -0.0638** -0.1008 -0.0011 -0.0003 -0.0008 0.0077 0.0011 0.0029 
 (0.218) (0.019) (0.103) (0.182) (0.165) (0.149) (0.131) (0.288) (0.425) 
FD -0.4573*** -0.0511 -0.1928* -0.0023*** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0060** -0.0023*** -0.0061*** 
 (0.003) (0.382) (0.095) (0.001) (0.762) (0.943) (0.011) (0.001) (0.000) 
GDw -0.0002** 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.028) (0.489) (0.506) (0.108) (0.917) (0.916) (0.109) (0.431) (0.791) 
FD*GDw(30) 0.1618** 0.0289 0.0308 0.0012* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0042 0.0010 0.0013 
 (0.034) (0.173) (0.462) (0.053) (0.992) (0.964) (0.201) (0.112) (0.634) 
FD -0.3591*** -0.0366 -0.2491** -0.0024*** -0.0002 -0.0013 -0.0050*** -0.0018*** -0.0068*** 
 (0.006) (0.497) (0.047) (0.001) (0.414) (0.126) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDw -0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0001** -0.0002** 0.0000 -0.0001** -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.009) (0.209) (0.026) (0.026) (0.311) (0.044) (0.222) (0.865) (0.501) 
FD*GDw(50) 0.1865*** 0.0514* 0.1074** 0.0019*** 0.0004* 0.0010** 0.0025 0.0002 0.0022 
 (0.005) (0.069) (0.013) (0.005) (0.063) (0.019) (0.444) (0.754) (0.335) 
FD -0.2683*** -0.0295 -0.2121 -0.0021*** -0.0003 -0.0016 0.0004 -0.0013*** -0.0049*** 
 (0.002) (0.535) (0.270) (0.002) (0.260) (0.150) (0.889) (0.008) (0.006) 
GDw -0.0002* -0.0001 -0.0001* -0.0002* 0.0000 -0.0001** 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.080) (0.126) (0.058) (0.052) (0.266) (0.044) (0.523) (0.226) (0.348) 
FD*GDw(70) 0.1900* 0.0811** 0.2123** 0.0019** 0.0005* 0.0017** -0.0078** -0.0012** -0.0021 
 (0.081) (0.043) (0.042) (0.013) (0.067) (0.042) (0.030) (0.049) (0.419) 
Notes: 1-step system GMM estimations of equation (1) on samples with different data frequency. In the estimations performed 
on the annual sample, the set of control variables differs from the default case in two respects. First, the average Worldwide 
Governance Indicators are omitted because data are available only on a biannual basis until 2002. Second, time dummies are 
included in the ‘conditioning set’. 
“maxL” – The lag order of GMM level instruments is maximized at 2. “maxL&cl” – collapsed instrument matrix & GMM level 
instruments lag maximized at order 2 (Roodman, 2009b). Legal origin and imperial legacy dummies are involved as standard 
instruments in each case. The constant and the coefficients of the ‘conditioning set’ including the lagged dependent variable are 
omitted to save space. P-values of the t-tests are in parenthesis and are calculated according to standard errors which are robust to 
heteroskedasticity across and arbitrary pattern of autocorrelation within countries. Asterisks denote the significance level (*: 10%, 
**: 5%, ***: 1%). Structural breaks significant at the standard levels are depicted in bold. The results are presented in a block-
wise structure and each FD-DRD-DRD(#) specification is framed by a dashed line. 
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